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PREFACE 
This thesis is an attanpt to devel.op new way-s of educating or 
indoctrinating naval persoonel an the mission and capabU1t7 of the 
Nav;y. In reaching this objective it was first necessary to review the 
N~• s mission as it relates to the national strategy of the United 
States ard to snmmarize ita present capability to wage war. 
The second phase 11'&1 then to determine the amount of understand-
ing naval personnel have ot these areas, and how it is distribllted in 
the personnel structure. This form ot &Il&l¥eis led to the utiliZation 
of a descriptive type ftl"Ye:Y of 166 na.val personnel. The surve,y stuqy 
is tho backbone of the thesis and is believed to be a significant step 
. 
in the Navy' 8 utilization of this form of research. In this respect 
the survey- m~ be considered in the nature of a p~t •tud;V which 
could tom tho baSis ot a more detailed .and .lal"&er scale research 
project. The writer ascertained during interviews with researchers 
in the Personnel lleasuremmt Research Brmch of the Bureau of Naval 
Persormel, Washington, D. c., that this stuqy does not duplicate 8.If¥ 
that has been undertaken by that office. 
A comprehensive statemmt of the Navy• 8 mis•ion and a discussion 
of ita present capability are necessary elements in developing the 
survey and interpreting the results. This understanding ot mission 
and capabilities serves as a foundation for the entire .t~. 
1h:Ue the fundamental mission-control of the seas--baa not 
1v 
changed, the means (capabilities) for accomplishing this mission have 
taken on a new look ae a reeult of the tranendous eci.mtific develop-
ments occurring smce World War II. Such a changing picture then is 
the cause ot the problem of education as seED by tbis writer. 
Fundamental changes aro taking place in three major pcysical 
characteristics o:t the Nav,y; it is going fran oU to nuclear energy 
for power to propel its shipa, b'<:m guns to guided missUes for ita 
armament, ~ fran gunpowder to ataaic weapons and ~SUpersonic planes 
for its offensive power. Such a fiuid situa.ticm calls for conti.tiual 
assessment of the effect such changes have QD. attitudes and abilities 
of personnel who must adjust to these changes. Do they understand the 
over-all affect of these changes en thai. r jobs-their fut~e-as part 
of the Navy team? Are they keeping up with the pace of these changes? 
This stu~ would have been impossible Without the interest and 
active coopera1i1cn of the teaching staff of Boston University' s School 
of Public Relaticm.s and Camnunications. Grateful aclmolt'l.edgment is 
made to its members for their helpful guidance during the formulative 
and a.:a&qtical stages of the stu<\r. Special acknowledgJn.ent is made to 
the staJ.'f of the Division of Research for its contribution to the 
solution of problans involved in the su.rYe;y of naval personnel. 
Special recognition is acknowledged to Dr. Nathan llaccob,y, Chairman 
of the Division of Research and Professor of Opinion Research} colm 
nein, Instructor in Camnunioation Research, both for their m&n7 help-
fUl criticisns of the research project and its refinemmt at the various 
stages of progress; and to Samuel G. Atkinson, Professor of Public 
T 
Relatione and major thesis adviaor, for his encouragement and guidance 
in p~anning and executing the over-all 8tud3'. 
CCilsiderable assistance was prOV1.ded by Canmander Eric s. Purdon, USN, 
District Public Ini'ormatioo Officer, Firat NaTal District , his staff 
and Captain V. J . !leola, USN, Camnand1ng Officer, U. S. Naval Receiving 
Statim, BOstoo, and personnel ot hill ccxnmand. 
The ~ter also acknowledges with thanlaJ the ecntribu11 one made 
by the several oavill reaervist p-aduate students at Boston University 
llbo cmtr1buted ideas for use 1n the questi onnaire and aided in its 
prelim:lnary check on validity. 
Boston, Mass. 
J~, 19$7 
K. • Koorhead 
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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLE2l AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
Since World War II there have been a number of important changes 
in the fundamental concepts of sea power, strategy, tactics, and weapon 
systems. Two major factors haVe caused these cban~s--pressures of the 
cold war and a number of great scientific developments. Of major 
concern to the Department of the Na-f7 is the effect of these rapid 
changes on the attitudes, understanding, and adjustocnts required of 
its pers<Xmel. 
, 
I . THE PROBLSI 
Statement ,2! !:!! probl • • The purpose of this stu~ is to in-
vestigate, through scientific research techniques, how well naval per-
sonnel understand the Navy-• s missi on and its capability to carrr out 
that mission. Then, using the results of this investigation, to build 
a plan of education to supplement or :improve present methods in accan-
plishing this objective. 
Importance .2! ~ atuc\t• A basic consideration in this stu<tr was 
the realization that motivation, or intereSt-attitude lEWels of person-
nel, in these areas is of an extrE&~ heterogeneous nature when con-
sidering the entire personnel structure of the Navy. PsyohoLlgical.l¥1 
however, knawledgeabili ty in these areas con tribltes great:Q- to the 
total character develotnent of the man in uniform. His adjusttlent to 
2 
the Service, by a better understanding ot hie role in it, 1fill permit 
him to function more etfeoti vely' in future mili tar;y assignments in 
which he shares the reapcnsibilities or the global canmitments of 
the Navy. 
Public relations significance. Various studies on retention of 
persoxmel in the nlitary services have pointed out that a great number 
1 
did not feel tta part ot" the service. On the contrary, a great number 
felt that they were silnp:Q' small "cogs• in a "big machine. " 
These people could not relate their daily tasks to the larger 
purpose or objective of their ctlmn'md unit, or in turn, to the over-all 
missicn of their branch of serrtce. The public relations problan than 
ia to help naval persCilllel understand the nature of their tasks and to 
give them recognition as human beings. 
b£n this is accanplishecl, the Navyman' s attitude to hi8 work 
and sbipnates should improve; he Will becane more of a group member 
reflecting a higher degree of e!Prit ~come. His personal and f~ 
relationships should also improve because he knows better wb;y he is 
in uniform, in whi-ch direction he is heading, and how to get there. 
Because he has more con!idmce in himself, understanding his own goals 
better, he is better able to C&rr'T out the Navy• s mission. This well-
adjusted imli.Udual then becanes a more effective "~leanan" or 
1 
Conclusions from a atu~ of 211 off"icers leavag the Nav,y in 
September, 1956, shaw'ed that p-eater leadership emphasis •s needed 
to give junior officers "a sense of helongi,ng" and to furnish the 
"information on the Navy's role, missions, and future. n The su.rvq 
was cmducted by the Personnel AnaJ.Tsie Dirt aim, Bllreau ot N &Tal 
Personnel, and reported in the Officer Fact Book# NAVPEBS lS898, 
{Washington; Depar1aent ot the N~, 1~, P• 2-8. 
.3 
"spoke&:lAD" for the N&Y,Y. Ini!rtead of a negati~e attitude he will 
begin to think ccnstruotive~ in terms ot career planning. 
The ~ •VT will benefit tr endolleq b7 improving tbeae attitudinal 
traits ot character, oonfidenoe, and • ll-boing Since the.y canitest 
th aelvee so predaninatel7 in interpereonal relations-4 fundamental 
• 
consideration iD CCIDID.unicating w:1.th people 1n more eaningful. uya. 
n . LlltlU1'IClfS OF THE STUDY 
The etud.Y ie an attG:Ipt to measure knowledge levels, attitudes 
and op1n1one ot a sample representing •• cloael;y aa possible the 
tire personnel structure ot the lf&YT• Social acienoe research tee~ 
niquee have been used ba.t due to geographical ooneideratione the 8\ll'Yey 
as conducted in the area ot Bostcm (for enlisted men) , and b7 m.aU 
(for officers) within the i'irst anl. District (llaesachusetts, New 
Hampshire, llaine, and Rhode Island) including ships operatina 1n the 
area. 
n . DEFllfiTI<liS OF TlimiS 
Jlinion. The fundamental nrtime mieaion of the Navy is to con-
trol the seas and den;y their uae to the en~. \lbile tbia basic 
assignment bas not changed, the nature and scope ot the various roles 
involved ha~e changed cmaic:lerabll' since orld ar II. These Will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter n . 
ROlee. 'For this paper •roles• are cmeidered to be sp itic aspects, 
or tasks, that 1n the aggregate compose the NP"T' a mission. Di this sense 
the;y are the lesser divisions or !!!.,.b-m.i-- .s .... n-.o ... n... s ot the over-all misliO 
4 
Functima. This term is 8JI1cnymous With "respmsibilities, • 
"miasims, n and "tasks• as defined in the directive isSlled by the 
Secretary of Defense 1n.l953 to cl..ar11'y the f\Dlctions of the Armed 
2 
Forces and the Joint Chiefs cf Staff. 
Oapabilitiea. This is a ~eric term applied to all offensiYe 
and defmsive warfare action• in support of the Na-.y• s miasion. 
The tem may bo broken dolll.l to appq to a very specific, narr01r task 
but implies amount or voltae of delivery to accaaplish and suetain 
the purpose or objecrt.ive. Thlis, a eta tement that the Na-.y has a 
~abllity of airborne early' waming (in a specific overseas ·area, 
for example) implies that enough planes and radar equipment are 
available to give the mi.il:imum proteotion or coverage to that area. 
IV. AREA TO BE S'lUDIED 
.;.Sourc,;,;;;;;;,.;;,.;;e..;;.s 2!, ~· This stuc:b'" bas been developed tran four major 
sources o£ information: (1) a descriptive survey of officers and men 
on active dilty in the Navy, (2) official Nav,y training publications, 
(3) report on enlisted career 81Jilpos:L&, and (4) ;interviews With cdnca-
tors and others. 
ethod .2£ procedure. Data and 1n.fcrmatim from these sources 
waa analyzed in respect to d&Yeloping the major objective ot the thesis-
a plan of education. 
Treatment 2!, find:inga. Ana],yais of data trom the above sources 
211Functions of the Armed Jorces and the JQint Chiefs of Staff, 
Secretary of Defense, October, '1.953, Section VII, appearing in The 
I>epart.sent of the !'!!!z and Its Secretary (Washington: Departcent'Ot 
the Navy, i956J';'"p. 11~ see AppendiX A for additi<mal terms and 
def'initions. 
was utllized in developing the final recommendations in the plan ot 
education. In this process the anaqsia ot su.rve;y findings •a related. 
to apeei.!io rec endations in the conclusions discussed in Chapter VI. 
other sources are related to the plan llberever practicable. 
CHAPTmt II 
BACKGROOHD 
One is inclined to think that the Navy' s mssion is s:impq to 
"control the seas" and let it go at that. Such a convenient psycho-
logical device tor understanding canplex phulC:aen.a is a gross over-
simplification ot the many factors involved 1n formulating the N•YT' s 
illissioo. 
I . THE NAVY• S IUSSIOlf 
In order to gain a greater understanding of this mission it is 
necessary to disouss the concepts on which it is founded. These are 
the concept .2! national strategr and the cQlcept 2£. ~power. 
Concept .2£ Naticnal Strateg:r. The very existence of the u. s . 
Navy is related directl,y to the national strategy of the United States; 
its aims and objectives, its natural. resources, natiroal incCXle, and 
foreign commitments. These are some of the determinants of natimal 
strategy. 
Since orld War II the United States has assumed the leadership 
role or the !reo world, a role reflecting the desires and oapabili ties, 
need and courage, threats and resiatance, appetites and weaknesses ot 
sane 7<>-odd nations. Admiral Carney, former Cbiof of Naval Operations 
eaid: 
With t he signing ot NATO and S TO, plus all the bilateral 
and multilateral agreemmts throughout the world, sea control 
7 
must be given collective coneideratial, th each nation contri-
buting those strengths best sa.ited to its technological, eoonomic, 
political, military, and geopoapbic circumatanc a . One count1y 
ma,' have non-cUi tar.r maintenance strengt~ another mq be riCh 
in mineral deposits, still another mw have specialized in buUd-
1ng and operating canbatant tonnage. l.-
Conc!J?t ~ .!!! power. Ono measurement of the status and strEngth 
of a countr;y 1.8 in tems ot its capacity or capability to maintain 
control ot the sea. The nation With control of the sea is 1n a position 
to motivate the popul.atic:ns and aaaeble the material r sources ot the 
Entire tree worl d. 
The united States, accorcling to former Secretary' of the Uav 
'tbcaass 
is more depEndent than ever on overaoaa sources ot raw materials. 
Ot the 77 etrateg1o and cr:ttioal materials needed tor our defense 
production, ciVilian industries, support ot our econUQ', and 
maintenance of our standard ot living, 66 ot th llUSt b imported 
in whole or in part traD across tho oceans. In onl;y ll ar w 
self-sufficient. ithout access to 011r transoceanic sources of 
raw terials, we could not build modem a1rpl.anes, nuclear-powered 
ships, missiles, electrcnic equipment, and th~ J:lOdern chinerr 
of all k:in.d8 that go into our armed aernces. 
Sea power, meaea.red 1n ships, planes, napals, and men, then must 
keep opm the vital lines of ccmnmtcation and 811pp:qJ project fight ing 
pol'ler i'ra:n the sea onto en8111' BOUJ support 0\11' world41dtJ base BystemJ 
!Ult'ill international agre entas co~trol enerq aul:marines, and ma:t:JT 
others. 
1 
Robert B. Came;r, Acb.iral, USll. •Principles ot Sea Power,• 
Naval Institute Prooeedins1. September, 19.5.5, P• 971. 
2 
Charles s. Tbanas, :f'ormer Secret.ai7 of' the av, in a ape h 
before the ~on Subc ttee, United States Senate, June 27, 19$6, 
!!!z Public Statements ( ash1ngtaos Department of the Hcv;y, A1J8UR, 19.$6), 
P• 2. 
8 
II. VARIOOS ROLrn 
The most comprehensive statEment of the various roles, functions, 
and responsibilities o! the Navy Tlas .found :in a special publication 
used by the Secretar;y of the N&'Y7 as a current reference source and 
3 
for briefing new secretaries as they are appointed. 
The United States Navy ex18ts for two fundamental purpases. 
First, the Hav' s task is to support the foreign policy of the 
United States in Wid~ separated areas of the world. Naval 
forces deployed for this purpose arc also reaey for war-limited 
war, as well as all-out nuclear -.r. Second, the Navy• s role in 
war is to control and use· the seas for our. own purposes and to 
deny their use to the enEq". Of major importance is the task ot 
controlling the vi tal sea approaches to the United States and the 
Western Hemisphere, in order to dezv their use to enGUT forces-
air~face, and sub-surface. The Navy must also supp]¥ and sup-
port the OYerseas operatioos of ground and air !orcesJ it must 
maintain camnunications With fr1E!'ldly and allied nations around 
the globe; and it must maintain camnunicat1on with United states 
overseas sources ot raw materials. 
A modern, well-equipped Navy has the unique characteristic of 
enabling the United States to project it.s national power, includ-
ing ground and air elements into any strategically important area 
of the globe. Naval power represents an econat!Y' of j,nvestment 
in national security vrhich cannot be matched by any other fom 
of military p011'er. Units of the fieet are part of the sovereign 
territory- of the United States, regardless of llhere they mq be 
operating. No internatiooal agl"eements or canmitments need precede 
our use of naval forces which operate in 1ntem.ati<nal waters of 
the high seas. Naval forces are practica.J.ly self- su.staining and 
nom.al.ly replenish themselves at sea. 
In addition to the aboYe offensive mission, tho Navy bas 
the responsibility of protecting ~e continen"taal United States 
.t'rm attack by way of the sea. AciYent of the 811.hnarine capability 
of launching guided missUes with nuclear warheads great:q increasea 
the antisubnarine warfare task of the Nay. Intensive research 
3 
:£!!! Department ,2! ~ !!!z !!!!! ,!!! Secretary, a report on basic 
facts pertaining to the Navy, how it operates, and its place :in the 
organization f or national security. Prepared by the Administrative 
Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy (l aahington: Department of 
the Navy, 1956), PP• I - 1 to I-6. 
9 
and development are needed to meet it. 
Uobile naval forces represent an investment hich al..,s 
remains the pr<;Jperty of, and under the control of, the citizma 
of the United States. The eco~ of naval power explains in 
large measure why nations in histor.r which have bad the w:i.adcm 
to turn to the eea for security have invariabq been able to 
preYaU over their land-power rivala. 
The rol e of the United states NaV)' is increaaingl¥ important. 
The sise ot the Nny• s task and the ~le With which it 1l'1ll work 
Will vary with the changing world situation, as well u With 
tecl'llological deTel.Opments. the size of the task and tbe nature 
of the tools during any giTen period will depend upon maey factors, 
among which ares 
1. The Will of the people ot t he Uldted States to retain 
their positicn as a world power. 
2. United states reliance upon overseas sources of raw 
materials. 
3. The nature and number ot United States overseas politi-
cal and militaly commitmente. 
4. The nature and extent of a prevaUing threat to the 
security of the United States. 
S. The influence of new developnenta in weapons on tactics 
of naval power. 
To attain a clearer understanding of the effect Which the 
foregoing factors 1lill have upon the future role of the Nav)7, 
each Will be considered separate!¥. 
orld power. TOdq, the United States hae asSlDed the 
responsibility of tree world leadership, a responsibility which 
we did not seek but whioh is bestowed upon as as the greatest 
pcnrer of the tree world emerpng frQn World ar IL To under-
stand the meantn& of this power and ita influEnce upon other 
nations, it :is first neoes8&J7 to consider our geographical 
position. A stu<tr of the globe reveals t hat about 70 percent 
is water... • uch of the land area consists ot deserts, moun-
tain areas, and waateland.e, 11hich are not 8\lited to support large 
populations. The most populous areas of the aartb are, first 
Europe and Western AsiaJ second, Eastern A&iaJ third, IndiaJ 
fov..rtb, the United Statea; and fi£th, Japan. Since intemation&l 
relations are relations between groupe of people, most ot our 
major problens :In this field arise in our dealings with these 
heavi.J¥ populated areas, all of which are rea<li.q accessible to 
tbe United States by wq of the aea. 
The canm.on bond of the seas connecting the United States 
Y.1 th her maey friEnds and allies around the world is a powerful 
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force which has been a source of understanding among the maritime 
natiCils of the world for •aJV' centuries. lti th very few eJO:ep-
tiona today, wherever the land touches the sea, the United States 
has friends and allies. It is evident that wery important inter-
national decision we have made s:lnce the end of World War n is 
based on the assumption that we can and wUl maintain control of 
the seas. In other words, though not specifica.l.ly stated as such, 
the United States in her actions is pursuing a national polic.r 
based on maintaining control of the seas. The majority of the 
maritime nations have aigo,ed mutual defense pacts with the United 
States. Even though mat\T of these nations are situated 1n posi-
tions exposed to Soviet attack, all signed the pacts with the feel-
ing that they were bound to us, rather than separated tr01:1 u11 
by' the eeas. And in so signing, each nation staked its future on 
the abU1t7 and intention of the United States to maintain ita 
position as a leading worl d power. This position of world power 
cannot be maintained unless we continue to maintain the ab1l1t7 
to d<Dinate worldwide sea oCIIDiluni,cations... • 
Reliance upon raw material•• bile orld ar II lett the 
United States :1n the position of a great world power, the same 
war was also a substantial drain on our own natural resources. 
Great scientific and tecbnolog:lcal advanoes which are being made 
in all areas of research are placing new demands on raw materials 
llhich either do not exist in this country or are beooming in short 
supp~. For these reasons the United States, relative~ self-
su.fficient in agricultural produce is rapi~ becoming a "have 
not" nation. e are forced to import fran all parts or the 'WOrld 
fran 25 to 100 percent of each of over 50 essential r w materials 
ranging from asbestos to zinc. It is the Navy' a responsibUit7 
to provide for the security of our worldwide overseas trade, and 
so maintain our essential war industries as well as the war efforts 
of our allies. ith our worldwide sea cQDIBUnications secured, 
the world stands nth us; lfi.thout them, we stand alone. 
OYerseas c tments. The Na"'¥71 s fUture responsibilities 
will also be dependent upon the number and nature of United States 
overseas commitments. An estimate of our future obligations can 
be based on our present pledges. Today the United States is bound 
by mutual defense treaties to 42 nations, comprising 680 million 
people on six continents across the world' s major oceana. esides 
the mutual defense treaties, we are bound by no less stringent 
ties to an additional 20 nations With nearly halt the total pop-
ulation and approximate~ baU the total land area ot the earth. 
All of these lie across the oceans tr the United States. e 
have canmitted large port.ions of our military forces and resources 
to estern Europe, the Mediterranean basin, and the lleatem Pacific 
1n order to assist free peoples of the world to defend themselves 
against possible CO!!Imunist a~gression. The United States, in addi-
tion, 1s providing economic ud and mUitary missi ons to the !our 
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comers of the free world. It will be necessary to continue our 
overseas camrltments, tre:nendous as they are, in the foreseeable 
future. 
The United States has made these political and military 
commitments as much in its own interest as in that of its allies. 
For it is our allies who Will eventually restore the balance of 
power in Fhrope and Asia •••• 
The Navy is respmsible for sustaining and providing for the 
security of the many contingents of the Army- (in 73 countries) and r 
Air Force stationed overseas. Stationing of land forces overseas 
in peacetime presu.ppoees that they can be sustained and supported 
by sea .!ran the dq a war begins-not a week or a month later. 
This is a D-dq respansibUity of the Nav;y l Unless logistic 
support can get through to them, and unless their posi tiona can 
be secured, our forces must eventual.ly withdraw fran their over-
seas posi tiona or face destruction. The sane is true of ail1' other 
canmitment. If the Navy is unabl e to maintain control of the 
water leading to, or adjacent to, critical areas of the globe, 
ai\r forces which we have in such areas 1Ji.ll be in serious difficult;y. 
Responsibilities of the Navy toward any overseas camnitments 
of the future r.tay be illustrated by our current canmitmEnts in 
estern Europe alone. In order for the Arrq and Air Force to 
fulfill their missions in Western Europe, the Navy must be prepared 
to perform three broad tasks in the eyent of war. First, the NaT,Y 
must continue to maintain sea ccamnunicatians to Western Europe. 
In order to accanplish this, enemy subaarines, aircraft, surface 
cratt, and other weapons which can be used against our convoys 
must be repelled or destroyed. Enany bases fran which these 
weapons c m operate must be neutralized. Second, the Navy must 
provide canbat support to U. s. and allied land forces. This can-
bat support includes air, missUe, and gunfire support. It includes 
landing of .Army and Air Force "Where and when they are required. 
I t includes the capabUi ty of bringing them off the beach when 
required- not as refugees, bu.t ae organized fighting units. Ex:-
perience 1n Korea reanphasized the fact that, in order for arq 
army to conduct succeaaful combat operations overseas, adequate 
naval forces must be in a position to supply it, support it, and. 
secure its fianks. Befor e we can do this, !! ~ .!:!!!! ~ ~ 
under our control. This w1ll be as true in any future war aa it 
has bemin the past. Third, the Navy must den_y to the enEJDT 
areas essential to his operaticms. If an enEID1' is permitted to 
use the Baltic and Norwegian Sea• unmolested, our estern Europe 
position will be outfianked fran the north, and gland Will 
become untenable. Therefore, 1n order to protect the Northern 
European fiank, shipping, naval forces, and aircraft, llhich an 
enemy employs to exploit these eeaa, must be neutralized or dee-
troyed. This w1ll include neutraliztltion of bases fran which 
enf!lll1" forces operate. Unless an Blfm1'' a ability' to uae the 
Aegean Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and Adriatic Sea ia denied, 
our &ropean position Will nentu.alJ.T be outflanked tr the 
South. 
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lor ch overseas canmi tment made b.Y the United States, the 
N8V7 bas certain definite respanaib1l1t1ea. The BaYT must suppq 
and support it, and mut protect it frCD overseas attack by an 
enEUJT. It ia eYident that current N&'f'T OYerseas responaibUitiea 
are cansiderable and cannot be exp ted to decrease. 
Aa our allies regain their strength and the balance of power 
is restored on the perimeters of Europe and 181a, it can b cti-
oipated that our forces and base tac111ties on foreign aoil ll'1ll 
gradual.J.T be reduced. Aa this occurs, th 1nfiuence exerted b7 
our mobile naval f orces stationed in international watera in st.ra-
tegicaJ.l¥ important areas of the globe Will be vi talq important 
to 0\lr continued eecurit7. Such ~oroes, equipped with the latest 
weapons--including atanic weapons, new aircraft, and ballistic 
missi les-and maintained in the highest state of readiness, can be 
a stabilising infiuence around the globe •••• 
The threat to our securttz. In order to ~e the extent 
and natUre ot them:t l itacy threat to the security of the Uni ted 
States, we must again consider our geographical positicm ••• • 
To the north lies a traditianally trienciJ3 nation and beyond that 
a Tast Arctic wilderness. To the south are other trien.<:lq neigh-
bora. It becanes evident tbat th aecuri ty advmtage1 afforded 
us b,y our fortunate geographic position can be matched by' no other 
major nation or center of population. Those who would attack us 
lllUSt first cross the seas or the Arctic barrier. These great 
frontier areas have tradition~ been formidable natural barrier• 
to &IV m.av of the United States, but in this age of great tech-
nical progress thlll' can lose their valne r apidJI' unless we main-
tain the Will and wiedcla to control than b7 constant adaptation 
to scientific and technical adYances... • 
New devel opment•• The decisiTe nature of naval power Will 
increiiie With new dnel.o}amts in tactic s and weapons. Matima ~ 
have for JJWJ7 years strualed with the problem ot gainiDg c ontrol 
ot the sea for th-..el.Tea, or of deDJing it to their eD41mies. 
eapons and taotica have been DWQ" and ingenious. Sane ot these 
bave posed capab1li ties Which threatEned to make the cost ot con-
t rol.l1ng and using the eealanea prohibi ~i veq high. Bu.t more often 
than not, as new weapans haTe been dwel oped, the7 have been &clap-
ted to shipbOard use, facilitating ccotrol and use ot the sea. 
The gun, aine, t orpedo, and airplane have been used With great 
ettectiTeneaa to gain control ot the aea after each, in itl turn, 
as credited With capabilit1ea to den;r the seas to those who sought 
to control them. Todq, the mam threat s t o ou.r control ot the 
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seas appear to be the airplane, the subnarine, and the mine; 
tomorrow, it may be so ething else. With atanic Ycapons and 
ballistic missiles, it r equires little imagination to appreciate 
the tremendous poaeibilities of weapons such as these intelllgent].y 
applied to the problem of controlling and ueinr the seas •••• 
The Navy of the fUture 1fill have at its dieposal wt-apons 
and techniques which Will make it an even greater dominating 
force than it has bcm 1n the pest. NGYT woepons, including 
atomic weapons end balliAttc missiles, and new techniques Will 
enable the Navy to conduct nth increased effectiveness amphibious 
warfare, naval air warfare, sutmarine warfar~, ant1subnar1ne war-
fare, and other typea ••• much seaborne forces are capRble. 
Research in hull propulsioo deaicn is e.leo opening up new 
vistas which are yet to be fully explored. Limits on size and ~ 
uses of ships are not yet in sight. Since the first atan.ic 
subnarine, NAUTILUS, cannenced operati on" m 1955, the Navy• a 
revolution in ship design has taken on new impetus. This snb-
marine has now becane an active unit of the ncet, and the out-
standing success of. ite rcvolutionar.y nuclear propul~.on S,yfttem 
is canparable to the change f.ran sail to steam in the last cen-
tury. As our experience in conrrt.ruction of nucloar-poweroo ships 
increases, the time reqUired to lni.ld them, as well as their cost, 
will become progressively loss. It is planned "to incorponte 
lDlClea.r propulsion OJ"'staus 1n t.h6 major portion of new subnarine 
construction and, in the next few years, to extend it tl) guided 
missile cruisers, frigates, and aircraft carriers. It ie 
probabl e that most cQilbatant ships 1l'ill ultimate:~¥ be atOl!l.ifl 
powered. With the a...~.dition or the "Jo'ORRE.STAL" class attack carrier 
to the neet and co:atirr..tiug improvEO.ent in present eapability of 
carrier-based jet aircraft to del iver atomic weapons, the increase 
in striking power of the Navy is inca1culabl e . 
III. NATICNAL SIDJRITY ACT AND THE 11FUNCTION" PAPERS 
Essential references for defining the rol es and missions of the 
Navy are incorporated in the following sources: 
1. National Security Act of 1947, ae amended to August 31, 1956. 
2. "Functions of the Anncd Forces and the Joint Cr.icft- of Staff, " 
October 1, 1953, a directive of the Secretar,y of Defense. 
3. 11Clarification of Rol es and Missions to Im"Orove the Effective-
ness of Operati on of the Department of Defense, " N o;Et:lber 26, 1956, a 
maaoran by the Secretar;y of Defense to the Armed • orces Pol1q 
Council. 
These documents represent iUndanental policy plamins in the 
assignments of specitic tasks to the various militar.r aervicea. Parts 
of these dOcunents are quotacl for a better understanding of the 
specific respmsibUi ties assigned to the H aTy. 
National Securitx ~!! ~· he act. defines the Departoent of 
the BaTT as foUcnnn 
SDJ. 206. (a) The term "Department of the MaTT u used 1n 
this act shall b construed to mean the Departc.ent of the aT1 
at the seat of govermentJ the headquarters, United States 
l!arine Corps; the entire operating forces of the United States 
Navy, including nnali ai'iaticm, and of the United States Kar1ne 
Carps, including the reaene cca.ponents of Sllch forcesJ all 
field activities, headquartera, forces, bases, installatiens, 
actiVities, and functions under the ccntrol or su-pervision ot 
the Department of the Nav,n and the United States Coast Guard 
when operating as a part of the N aYT pursuant to laW. 
Su,bparagrapba (b) and (c) -ere repealed and substituted by- the 
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following current provisions: 
(10 USC) S • S012. United States II&TTJ ccmpositionJ 
tunc tiona 
(a) The Navy, within the Department of the &YT, incltldea, 
in general, naTal cCIIlbat and aei"'ric forces and such aviation 
as mq be organic therein. 'l'he aT¥ shall be organized, train.Gd, 
and equipped primar~ for operat1.ons at sea. It ia responsible 
tor the preparation of naYal .f'ol'{see necessary- tor the ettectiTe 
preparation of naval f orce• n"eaaar;r for the effectiTe proaec11tion 
of war except ae otherwi aasigJ:led and is generall7 responSible 
tor naTal reconnaissance, antieubnartne warfare, and protection 
to shipping. 
4 ~., P• II- 13. 
Sibid., P• II- 28 (Synopsis, Appendix m). 
-
1$ 
(b) All naval aviation shall be integrated l'fith the naval 
service as part thereof Within the Department of the Navy. Naval 
aviation consists of canbat and service and training forces, and 
includes land- baaed naval aviatioo, air transport essential for 
naval operations, all air weapoo.s and air techniques involved 
in the operations and actiTitiea of the Navy, and the entire 
remainder of tbe aeronautical organization of the Navy, together 
With the persoo.nel necessar.y therefor. 
(c) The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, 
technique, organization, and equipnent of naval canbat and ser-
vice elements. llattera of joint concern as to these function• 
shall be coordihated between the Arm:y, the Air Force, and the 
Navy. 
(d) The Navy is responsible, in accordance with integrated 
joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime 
ccaponenta of the Naoyy to aeet the needs of war. 
"..,Fun ...... c_t_i_o .. n... s !2£ ~Armed Forces !!!,2!:!!!, Joint Chiefs 2£ Staff, " 
October 1, 1953: 
SECTICN V- F\2noticn8 of the United States Navy and Harine 
Corp a 
'Yiithin the Dep~.rtm.ent of the Navy, assigned forces include 
the entire operating forcea of the United States Nav;y, including 
naval aTiation, and the United states Uarine Corps. These forces 
are organized, trained, and equipped primarily for pranpt and 
sustained canbat operations at sea, and for air and l and operations 
incident thereto. Of the three major services, the Navy has 
primary interest in all operations at sea, except in those 
operations otherwise assigned herein. 
A. Primary Functions 
1. To organize, train, and equip Navy and ll.arine Forces 
for the conduct of prompt and sustained canbat operations at sea, 
including operaticns of sea-based aircraft and their land-based 
naval air canponents. Specificallyt 
(a) To seek out and destroy enEmy naval forces 
and to suppress en~ sea commerce. 
(b) To gain and maintain general sea supremacy. 
(c ) To control vital sea areas and to protect 
vital linea or communication. 
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(d) To establish and maintain local superiority-
(including air) in an area of naval operations. 
(e) To seize and defend advanced naval bases and 
to conduct such land operations as may be essential to the pro-
secution of a naval campaign. 
2. To cooduot air operations as necessary for the 
accomplishment of objectives in a naval campaign. 
3. To organize and equip, in coordination ll'ith the 
other services, and to provide naval forces, including naval 
close air-support forces, !or the conduct of joint amphibiou~ 
operQtions, and to be respoosible for the amphibious training of 
all forces ae assigned for joint amphibious operations in accord-
anc e with the policies and doctrines of the J oint Chiefs of Staff. 
4. To develop, in coordination with the other services, 
the doctrines, procedures, and equipnent of naval forces f.or 
amphibious operati ons, and the doctrines and procedures for joint 
amphibious operations. 
S. To furnish adequate, timely and reliable intelli-
gence for the l~avy and arine Corps. 
6. To be responsible for naval reconnaissance, anti-
submarino warfare, the protection of shipping, and for mine lay-
ing, including the air aspects thereof, and controlled mine f'ield 
operations. 
7. To provide air support essential for naval operations. 
6. To provide sea-baeed air defense and the sea-based 
means for coordinating control for defense against air attack, 
coordinating With the other services in matters of ~oint concern. 
9 • To provide naval (including naval air) forces as 
required for the defense of the United States against air attack, 
in accordanc e with joint doctrines and procedures approved by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
10. To furnish aerial photograpey as necessary for 
naval and Marine Corps operations. 
u. {Pert!\Mls solfl.J' to the Marine Corps. ) 
B. Collateral Function• 
The forces developed and trained to perform the primary func-
tions set forth above sh4ll Nt empley'ed to support end suppl~ent 
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the other services in carrying out their primar,y functions, where 
and whenever such participation will result in increased effeotiTe-
ness and will contribute to the accanplisbment of the ov&r-all 
mili tary objectives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff mCJJber of the ser-
vice having primary responsibUi ty for a function shall be the 
agent ot the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present to that bcx%1 the 
requirements and pl ans for the employment of all forcee to carry 
out the function. He shall al so be rospmsible for presenting 
to the J oint Chief s of Stai'f .t&r final decision any disagreanent 
within the field of his pri:lnary r esponsi bility which has not been 
resol ved. This shall not be construed to prevent aey mEmber of the 
Joint Chiefs ot Staff :from presenting unila.teralJ¥ any issue of 
disagreement with another service. Certain specific collateral 
functions of the Navy and !Iarine Corps are listed below: 
1 . 'l'o interdict enan;y land and air power and communi-
cations through operation at sea. 
2. To conduct c l ose air support for land operations. 
3. To furnish aerial photography f or cartographic 
purposes. 
4. To be prepared to participate in the over-all air 
effort as directed by the J oint Chiefs of Staff. 
"Clarification .2£ Roles~ nssions !2 Improve~ Effectiveness 
2£ Operations E£. ~ Department of Defense. " This report to the 
members of the Armed Forces Policy Council clarified the following 
roles and missi ons: 
1. Use of aircraft by the u. s. ArJV• 
2. Adequacy ot Airutt:.. 
3. Air Defense. 
4. Air For ce tactical support of the A~. 
5. Intermediate range ballistic missiles • 
. 
Sections in which the Nav;y is specifically mentioned area 
3. (c ) . The Navy, in close coordination 1'li th the AI"'IJY and Air 
Foree, is assigned responsibility for the developnent, procure-
ment and e:nploy.umt of ship-based air defense weapon systems for 
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the accaoplishment of its assigned ~ctians. 
(e) . In overseas areas ••• Navy i'oroes should continue to 
bo responsible f or their own air defense at soa, employing organic 
means. as approved by the theater cam:u:nder, the air co:1ponent 
c ander should establidl such procedures for coordinating Anq, 
Navy, and Air Force air de.tense forces as 1J131' be r equired to carry 
out his resJonsibilitios, and, in addition, should establish such 
dotailed procedures as are necessary for proper coordi.rurtion with 
national air defense camr.anders o~ allied oountriers. 
S. (b) . Operational eaploym.ent of the ship-baaed intermediate 
ranr:;e ballistic missile s;ystEIIl will be the sole responsibility of 
the U. s . Navy. 
In su:Jlllai71 the Uavy' a mission, that of control of the seas, must 
be understood in terms of the national strategy of the United States 
and the collective desires of the American people. The Nayy is respon-
sible for executing their wishes, maintaining the degree or anount of 
.!!!! power they decide upm as an expression of national strategy. 
Congress has del egated specific tasks or functions to the Navy 
through the llational Security t of 1947 which were further clarified 
by the Secretary of Defense in 1953 and again in 1956. 
This backgr ound material has been presented here as an aid to the 
reader in understanding the nature of pr obltiD.S and principles invol ved 
in tho survey design, analysis, and concl usions discusaed in the r emain-
ing chapters of this stud:,y. 
CHAPTJ:B III 
SURVEY OF NAVAL PERSWNEL 
I. SURVEY DESIGN 
General. A descriptive surTey was utilized in order to obtain 
empirical data on which to build the plan of education. The purpose 
or general objective of the surYe;y waa to determine, through scientific 
research techniques, how well the concept of "mission" and the term 
"capabilities" are understood by personnel in the Baty. 
Specific objectives. A list of nine specific objectives was 
developed to serYe as analytical aide in clarif.ying the general objec-
tive. They were: 
1 . To determine the degree of understanding of "mission 11 and 
"capabilities" on the part o~ officers and enlisted men. 
2. To determine the level of factual knowledge in these areas 
from an awareness of current ennts pertaining to naval affairs. 
3. To assemble data on opinions of naval pers<nnel in regard 
to public recognition of the Na"TY' s importance. 
4. To assemble data on opinions of naval persomel as to the 
most effective weapons. 
5. of naval personnel in these 
areas in order to arrive at an indication of motivation to learn. 
6. To aesemhle data on sources of information utilized b;r naval 
personnel. 
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7. To gather data on reading habits of personnel in these areas. 
8. To asse:nble data on opinions of the adequacy of information 
in these areas. 
9. To assEmble ideas and preferences for training methods to be 
utilized in expanding present educational practices. 
llethodoloq. A number of questions relating to the scope and 
methodology had to be decided upon before proceeding with the survey. 
These were discussed in detail wi.th various members of "the teaching 
staff at Boston University whose concurrence was received. The more 
important of these were: 
1. ~ 2! sample. The sample size of 200 was arbitraril.y selected 
by the Wli ter to represent the approximately 6701 000 officers and 
men on active duty in the Navy. The officer porticn was arbitrarily 
set at 5o to represent the 701 000 officers while the nmnber of enlisted 
was set at 150 to represent the 600,000 enlisted men. Within these 
size limits the designed distribution of each group (by rank and pq 
grade structure) was arriTed at by perc entage distribution in accord-
ance With official personnel strength figures as of February 28, 1957. 
2. &tclusicne !£!!! ~ aaaple. In order to reduce sanewhat the 
number of subgroups it was decided tbat no Jlarines, AVES, nurses, or 
students unQer instruction would be included in the officer group. 
Exclusions in the enlisted group weres WAVES, men being processed for 
separation tram the Navy, and men in a discipUnary status. 
3. :Method~~ ..-.co..,.l.,.l ... ec...,t..,.i .. o .... n. The method of data collection was 
studied to determine whether depth. interviews or questionnaires would 
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be the most appropriate means of gathering data. Tho questionnaire 
appeared to be tho moat feasible for this stu~ due to the savings in 
time and expense with the addi tiooal advantage of allcnti.ng accumulation 
of a greater qum. tity of data in the time allotted for the stuc:\Y. 
Data collected and reported herein includes more than 12,400 itane 
of information. 
II. QUESTIOOAIRE CCNSTRUCTION 
After the specific objectives were drawn up and decided upon a 
large number of questions were constructed to obtain data relevant 
to each objectiTe. The questionnaire was sul:Ditted to three professors, 
five naval reservist officers, and other graduate students for face 
validity checks and camnEnts. Many suggestions for additional questions 
as well as deletions of scme were received and incorporated into the 
instrument. This development and refining process took several months 
of research and coordination. 
The same questioo.naire was ueed for both officers and enlisted 
nen which necessitated a certain sount of ccmpranise in style and 
canplexi ty of wording in order to reach the lowest and highest denCJ:ll-
inator of education level. Various erose-checks on truthfulness (valid-
ity- checks) in answering questions were built into the :inBtrum.ent. 
III. PRE-TmT OF QUF.STIO AIRE 
The pretest was conducted with nine enlisted men randan.l.3' selected 
fran transient personnel in the same place and in the same manner that 
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the final sampl e would be selected. Tho writer supervised the can.ple-
tion of the pretest questionnaires and interviewed the respondents 
after they had tumed in the c ompl eted forms. In this manner the 
individual questi ons were further refined and some unnecessary questions 
del eted. 
IV. DATA COLLECTION 
A number of problEms in regard to detail were t:ncountered in sel ect-
ing the sampl e and administering the questionnaires. General consider-
aticns included such p roblems as keeping a balance in distribution 
factors , such as: ship personnel vs. shore-based personnel; foreign 
service vs. no-foreign service; new r ecruits ve. old- timers; and special-
ists vs. general duty persomel . Selection of these factors were further 
canplicated by the ratios of each rank and rate (pay grade) lJrlel. 
Officer portion. This part of the sample was randallly selected 
from name rosters of approximately llO naval activities and camnands 
1 
within the First Naval District . Percentage distribution by rank 
categories was computed from official NaVT personnel figures, for the 
2 
entire Navy, as of February 28, 19.57 . These percentages were then 
applied in computing the sample catesories. 
Questionnaires were mailed out to officers 100 per cent in excesa 
1 See Appendix B for a complete list of nav:al camnands represented 
in the officer sampl e. 
2 
~and Marine ~orp{ llili~ Personnel Statistics , NAVP.I!BS 
15658, ---rebr\iary 28, l 9 7 . Washinoru Depart:tmt of the Navy, 19.57) 
various pages. 
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of designed quota in order to allow for the uStlal high percentage ot 
no-returns. Legal officers at the First Naval District saw no objec-
tion to using official franked mail for outgoing and retul'n or ques-
tionnaires. All mail questioimaires were tUrned over immediately to 
the writer upon receipt at the Distric-t Public Infonultion Office. 
&listed portion. This group was rand~ selected frcm transient 
persormel reporting for · further assigrment to the u. s. i~aval Receiving 
Station, Boston. Distribution by pay grades of the Navy's total person-
nel structure was canputed in a manner similar to the officer group and 
applied to the selection of the enlisted portion. Special categories 
were eliminated f'ran the sample baaed upon conference discussions and 
interest-attitude levels danonstratcd in the protest. These weres 
l. Men in a disciplinary status of prisoners waiting legal action. 
2. Men waiting to be separated frcm the Navy. 
3. Uen rehabilitated recently in retraining carunands as a result 
of serious offenses. 
The enlisted portion was scheduled for completing the questionnaires 
as part of their in-transit processing at the receiving station. llo 
time limit as specified. 
CHAPT:al IV 
SURVEY .ANALYSIS AND PRESllNTATICN OF RESULTS 
I. ANALYSIS PROCEWHE 
The analysis of data obtained in this BUrYe;y was organized in a 
manner to obtain as muoh uaetul intormaticm fraa the stud;y as possible, 
all of it in relation to the general and specific objectives listed in 
Chapter III. Cod.ing procedure and tabllating of responses are included 
in Part I of this chapter as the tirat steps in the analysis. The dis-
cussion of results in Part II ot this chapter follcnr the general format 
ot the questionnaires face sheet data, questions on mission, questions 
on capabilities, and questions on sources of info~tion. 
Cod.iz!g. Building of the code was started after the first group 
of oanpleted questionnaires was receiTed. About 30 questiomaires 
were ana.lyzed to determine the pattern of responses and form of word-
phrase groups appearing most trequentl;y in responses to open-end ques-
tions. Each possible question response was given a separate column 
including those for "don't lmow, n "undecided," and "no answer." 
Tabulatin& ~· After the oode was constructed it was transferred 
to oolUIDil headings on accounting work paper (14 x 34 inches) containing 
30 major columna each of which contained eevm analler colwms. Kore 
than 12,1&00 itEms of info.nuation were tabtU.ated in this manner fraa 
the 63 questions asked of each respondmt. After all questionnaires 
were coded and tabulated, the col.UIIID8 were added up and percentage• 
computed for use later 1n the ana~Bis. 
II. PRESmTATICN OF RESULTS 
Findings of the survey will be presented here in siX parts~ 
1. Re-evaluation of specific objectives. 
2. Characteristics of the sample • 
.3. Discussion of responses to questions on "mission." 
4. Discussion of respon•es to questions on "capabilities." 
5. Som-ces of information reported by the sample. 
Re-evaluation.£! original ~ecific objectives. The analysis was 
developed in relationship to the specific objectives outlina:Lin .. Chapter 
III. Modifications of preliminary objectives were required during 
the course of the stu<t" duo to the doubtful value of subgroup analy'sis 
Within the officer and enlisted personnel structures. It was apparent, 
after a study of presEnt training prograns, that any attempt to deter-
mine specific ranks and rate levels for more training in these areas 
was a theoretical matter and would not justify the cost and additional 
time required to break down each response into the twelve p~-grade 
subgroups. Efforts were made originally to study such related vari-
ables as: experience in the Navy, education, and major field of study 
for their effect on information attitude levels. Such an analysis was, 
however, determined to be of an anal¥tical nature beyond the scope of 
the ilmnediate study. Sane of the reasons for this dec1Bion were: the 
snall sample on lfhich to base specific .findings, difficulty in estabUsh-
ing criteria for these levels, and the time and expense limitation 
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which would not parmi t use of IBll punch cards for tabulating data. 
Instead, tabulating was limited to the two major personnel categories, 
officers and enlisted men, in such a manner that each was a canpl ete 
study or "profile" in itscl!. Then, the two were added together to 
arrive at a composite picture of what naval personnel !a2! (facts) and 
What they think (opinions) they know about the Navy• a mission and 
capabilit ies. The bulk of the 8naJ¥sia is presented in canparative 
table f orm Tfith responses converted into percentage figures for ease 
in studying relationships. 
Characteristics .2! ~ 881Lple . The final sampl e included 49 
officers and 117 enlisted men as canpared to the 5o officers and 150 
men originally planned. Reduction in the sample s i ze was due to an 
unanticipated reduction in transient personnel being processed at the 
u. s. Naval Receiving Station, Boston, during the period June 101 
through June 21, 19)7. The time period available for conducting this 
etud;r would not permi~ an extension of this portion of the survey. 
Nevertheless th~ aample is considered to be a fair rcpresentatim of 
the cross- section of naval peraOimel as indicated in Table I . 
T.A. LE I 
DISTRIWTI<N OF PERSCfiNEL APPEARlNG lN SAliPLE 
BASED UPC!i ACTUAL PntSClmEL STRmGTH 
FIOURES AT FEBRUARY 28, 1957* 
Officers 
Admirals 
Captains 
Canmanders 
Lieutenant Canmandera 
Lieutenants 
Lieutenants (Junior Grade) 
Fhsigna 
't arrant Officers 
Total 
Enlisted 
Chief Petty Officers 
Pett;r Officers First. Class 
" " Second Cl ass 
" " Third Class 
Se~en, Airmen, etc. 
Apprentice Group 
Seaman Recruit 
Total 
Total Sample 
* 
Percentage 
strength in 
Nav,y 
o. 4 
5.6 
11. 6 
15.o 
21. 3 
21.6 
16.2 
7.2 
100. 0 
8.1 
11.6 
10.3 
20.2 
26. 9 
17.4 
~ 
Desi gned 
number to 
be in sample 
3 
6 
8 
lO 
ll 
8 
~ 
-
12 
17 
15 
3l 
44 
26 
~ 
27 
Actual 
sample 
No. % 
- -, 10.2 
lO 20. 4 
13 26.6 
lO 20.4 
8 16. 3 
Jt 6.1 iooso 
-
7 6.0 
20 17.1 
10 6.5 
ll 9. 4 
40 34.2 
29 24.8 
117** 100. 0 
166 
!!!!z ~ Marine ,£2!£! W.l1tarr Personnel Statistics, NAVPEBS 
15658, Februar;r 28, 1957. 
-11-:f. 
Enlisted portion of the final sampl e was not as high as orig1nally 
planned. This was due to a low level input into the u. s. NaTa). 
Receiving Station, Boston, during the two weeks aTailable for gathering 
data. All enlisted rating groups were represented in the sample exceptt 
construction, dental, and steward groups. 
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The final officer portion of the sample represented 15 commands 
1 
based ashore and five based afloat. Of these 46.9 per cent were in 
the reserve forces while 51.1 per cent were in the regular Navy. This 
distribution compares favorab~ with the actual distribution in the 
Navy which is 44.2 per cent in the reserves and 55.8 per cent regulars. 
Other characteristics of the officer portion are shown in the following 
tables 
TABLE II 
DISTRIWTICN OF OFFIC&t SPECIALTIES VHTH:m SAJIPLE 
COMPARED TO THOSE m FliTlRE NAVY 
Sample 
Hwnber 
Line officers (including 
aviators) 28 57.2 
Restricted Line Offi cers 4 8.1 
Staff Corps Officers: 
CiTil Engineer Corps 6 12.2 
Suppl;r Corps 3 6.1 
l!edical Corps 2 4.1 
Chaplain Corps 2 4.1 
Dental Corps 1 2.1 
Uedical Service Corps 
Canmissioned Warrant Officers 3 6. 1 
Total 49 1oo. o 
Navy% 
Feb. 28, 1957 
67.6 
4.9 
2.2 
7.1 
s.o 
1.2 
2. 6 
l..5 
7!2 
100.0 
Age distribution of officers was 20. 4 per cent in each five year 
category from 20 to 34 years and 38.8 per cent over 35 years old. Of 
these respcmdents, 53.1 per cent indicated they were in the Navy on 
a career basis while .38. 7 per cent indicated it w:s.s on~ a tEUporBry' 
line of work; 8. 2 per cent were undecided whether they would make the 
1 See Appendix B for a list of naval canmands represented in the 
sample. 
Navy a career. 
Service overseas since World War n was considered to be signifi-
cant 1n a man's understanding of the Navy's mission. Results of a 
question _on this itqn indicated t hat 75.5 per cent of officers and 
onl.y 46.2 per cent of enlisted bad performed duty overseas 1n the period 
mentioned. 
Education distribution among officers questioned indicated that 
~.9 per cent were college graduates and another 12.2 per cent had 
done postgraduate work. The stud;y of courses in engineering was the 
most predaninate ( 26. 5%) major field of stud;y. Arts ( 24.5%) 11 sciences 
(18.li%) 11 and business (12.2%) were the next most camnon stud¥ areas. 
It was also found that 75.5 per cent of the officer group was 
married and 63.3 per cent had children. oat of the officers (71.~) 
came frcxn the east coast of the United States, and 11sted their 
fathers • occupations in the "ald.lled" category ( 28.6%). The next 
highest occupation of the father was 1n the professional categor;r 
( 22.5~) with the balance (48.9%) divided evenJ.¥ between administrative-
management, small business awner, white collarJ and unskilled. 
Future career time rEma,ning for these officers showed that 26.5 
per cent were expecting to be r el eased from active duty within a year. 
The next largest group, 24.5 per c ent, were those with 10 or more years 
r anaining before retiranent. 
'lbe enlisted mm appearing in the sample varied .t.rcxn the officer 
group in a number of these characteristics. Generally, they were 
younger ( 49.7% were under 20 years of age canpared to ~ officers 
1n t hat age group}, had seen less active duty (26. 5% had been on actiTe 
duty less than a year), and fewer decided to make it a career (.5o.5% 
said "no" to career possibilities} . It was noted that a significant~ 
fewer number of Enlisted bad se"ed overseas (46.2%) compared to the 
officer group (7!).5%) and none had graduated fran college. The number 
of married enlisted ( 34. 2%) was less than half of the officers Who 
were married. Socio-econaa1c level o:r the enlisted group was indiCated 
by the fact that 69.2 per cent listed their fathers• occupations in the 
II 
"skilled," "sani- sldlled, 11 and "unsldlled" categories. Those expecting 
... 
to get out of the Navy Within a year were about half the officer group 
although 47 .o per cent of the enlisted group expected to be out of the 
Navy Within four ;rears. 
Responses~ queet1ons .2e mission. As stated earlier, the general 
objective of the surve;y was to attempt to measure how Yell the concept 
of miseion is understood by people in the Navy. It must be realized 
that no exact measur ent can be made of such a broad area of know-
ledge. The best that can be done is to infer the degree or amount 
of understanding a person bas tram the responses he gives to a series 
of fact and opinion questions r elated to the general topic. Such a 
procedure was followed in constructing questions to be submitted to 
respondents in this ~e;r. 
The questionnaire took several months to develop and a large vol-
ume of printed material was screened for ideas to be incorporated 
into the test instrumEnt. Onl,y those itans were used, with one excep-
tion, that had appeared in camno~ read sources of infomation re~ 
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available to all persons in the Navy. 
Related closely to knowledge level and of concern in this type of 
study is the interest-attitude a man has in learning about the broader 
aspects of his lite in the Navy. Ul he seek out Wonn.ation on the 
wission or must he be exposed to it entirely separate from his awn 
initiative? How must he learn about these matters? !lore precisely, 
how much motivation does be exhibit tcmard this knowledge area? 
The thirteen questions used to measure this area can be grouped 
roughly into fact , opinion, and interest-attitude categories. 
The first fact question: "As far as you Imow, did the Navy take 
any action in the Israeli- Egyptian crisis?" 1ms desiened to measure 
knowledge level on current affairs involving the Navy. The fact that 
the Navy evacuated American citizens during the crisis period waa Wi.d.el¥ 
publicized in civilian news media chamels and especial~ in service 
newspapers and magazines. Other Navy notion in thft crisis period 
included placing ships in a hi(;her state of readiness, addition of 
several fleet units, and concentration of the Sixth Fleet in the 
eastern area of the Kediterranean. The following table indicates 
survey responses to this questions 
TABLE Ill 
NAVY ACTI CN IN ISRAELI- IDIPTIA.'{ CRISIS 
RESP<NSES GIVFN BY SAKPLE 
Officers 
.Response % 
t vacuated u. s. citizens 27.7 
· Stand- by (readiness) 32.3 
Showed strength 26.2 
Took no action 4.6 
Strengthened fleet 4. 6 
Don' t know 
No answer ~6 
Total 100.0 
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Total 
Fhlisted Sample 
% % 
17.9 21.3 
10.6 18.1 
9. 7 15.4 
43.1 29.8 
1.6 
13.0 8.$ 
S.1 '·~ 100.0 100.0
Ot significance ia the high number of enlisted men (43.1.%) who 
said the N rrry did not take aey action. The "don • t knowfl enlisted group 
-
is also high in proportion to the officer group. 
A second lmowledge-level fact question was on the meaning of the 
abbreviations "NATO'' and "S ro. n the two major military alliance pacts 
betwem the United States and other free nati cns. NATO (North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization) is the Atlantic alliance, and SEATO (South b!ast 
Asia Treaty Organization) is the Pacific defense pact. Results of 
this question produced t he f oll.owing respanee:sc 
TABLE IV 
lliG OF T.ERl!S UATO AND SFATO 
R&<3PCN SES GIV'Eif BY SAUPLE 
Officers 
Code category % 
Know NATO 96.0 
Know S"" TO 83.6 
Don't know NATO 
Don't know SEATO 8. 2 
No answer NATO 2.0 
No answer SEATO 8.2 
Total 200.o* 
* 
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Total 
Enlisted Sampl e 
~ , 
47.9 62.6 
19.7 38.6 
35.9 25.3 
56.9 44.0 
16.2 12.0 
21.4 11·2 
200. 0 200.0 
Notel Two questions were asked 110 data was compiled on the 
basis of 200%. 
The table illustrates a very s1gn:lf1cant difference between groups 
on this questiOD. The drop in knowledge percentage on NATO by enlisted 
men was slightly more than 5o per cent, and far SFATO there was a drop 
of almost 64 per cent. The "don't lmowa" and "no answers" were very 
high in the enlisted group aleo. 
Four questions in the seotioo on mission were designed to measure 
opinions. Two asked respondents what they thought were the reasons 
2 
for keeping the Sixth Fleet in the Uedi terranean and the Seventh Fleet 
in the Formosa area. The third asked what they thought was the Navy' s 
role in air defense of the United States, and the fourth was the most 
2 Arleigh A. Burke, Admiral, USN, Aid, in a discussion on the 
problED in the Mediterranean, "Our mission would be to protect u. s. 
lives and property first... What happens other than that is dependent 
upon 'ftbat our am goverrment decides we should do." "H- Ba::tb Cannot 
Wipe Out the u. s. Navy," u. s. Jan aad World Report, May 4, 1956, 
P• 88. - - --
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crucial question- to state the Navy• s miBSion. The first two of these 
questions lli.ll be grouped together in discussion and table even though 
the Sixth Fleet question was open-end and the SeYenth Fleet question 
was closed-end. Table V shan the responses to these questions. 
TABLE V 
REASCNS FOR MAlNTA:UUNG 6TH AND 7TH FLEETS 
m RESPECTIVE OV.EltSEAS AREAS 
Officers Enlisted 
Sixth neet ~ % 
Prevent aggression- stop spread 
of Camnuni1111 19.6 9.0 
Show strength 15.2 12.3 
Goodwill toward Allies 12.0 9.0 
Proximity to area in case of 
trouble 10.7 6.5 
Readiness if needed 10.7 14.9 
Keep peace 8. 7 11.6 
others* 21.9 14.2 
Don' t lmow 7.7 
No answer 1.2 !!!· 8 
Total 100,0 100,0 
SeYenth Fleet 
Slow spread of Canmuni811 in 
57.4 38.4 South Eaet Asia 
Halt CCIDDltlllist attack on Formoaa 37.0 36. 8 
Prevent Nati onalists from attack-
ing the Mainland 3.7 18.4 
Other 4. 8 
Don't know 
No anner 1.2 1.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Total 
Sanple 
% 
13.1 
13. 4 
10.1 
8.1 
13. 4 
10. 5 
16.8 
4. 9 
2·1 100.0 
44.1 
36.9 
14.0 
3.3 
1el 
100.0 
* Includes a number of miscellaneous reasons none of which was 
considered to be significant. 
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The results shown above indicate more of a consistency- between 
groups "than was found in most of' the other responses. This fact 1e 
interesting to note where the ditferenoe in overseas du.t;y-f'irst-hand 
experience lli.th the Navy' s m188ion-was so gx-eat. In the officer group 
75.5 per cent bad served overseas ccmpared to the 46. 2 per cent of en-
listed men. The higher proportion ot "don' t lmows" and "no answers" 
to the Sixth Fleet question was probably due to the open-end type of 
questi on. 
The third question in the opinion area was: "What do ;you think the 
Navy• s job is in the air defense of the United States?" Gen~, 
the Navy• s role in this area is in the eemrard cxtEilsions of the radar 
warning network surrounding the United States. The N avy1 s task is to 
ertmd the DEl'f line (Distant Early Warning) and other~ by use of' ocean 
3 
station radar ships. The Navy• e area of interception of enemy planes 
is oTer the ocean e~anses. . Table VI shows responses made to thil 
question. 
3 
~~ P• 87. 
TABLE VI 
NAVY'S ROLE rl DEF~SB OF THE UNITED STAT~ 
Tot8l 
Officers Ihlistcd Sample 
Code categorz ~ !1 % 
Radar warning 31.4 16.9 21.8 
Interception of aircraft .31.4 17.6 22.) 
Support Continental Air Defense 
CCIDm8Ild ( CWAD) 8. 6 .7 ,3.4 
Support Air Force S.7 .7 2.4 
Counter Attack 2.9 4.4 3.9 
Off-shore patrol 1.4 a.a 6.) 
Small importance 2.9 .7 l.S 
Uedium importance 1.4 .!) 
Great importance 1.4 6.6 4.9 
Others 4.3 4.4 4.4 
Don't kncnr 1.4 19 .. :! 1.3.1 
No answer 7.2 20.0 ±2·2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Of significance here is the UO per cent (approxim.3te) enlisted 
group in the "don' t lmow" and "no answer" categories CO'.!lp4l'ed to the 
nine per cent of officers. Sane confusion in question meaning mq 
have occurred as evidenced by respondents• evaluation of job impor-
tance instead of stating what the role was in air defense. 
-
The most crucial question in the opinion area was the one aald.ng 
respondents to state the Navy' s miseion in their own words. Respond-
ents gave a great variety of statemEnts in their answers to this ques-
tion. Twenty- six word-phrase categories were used to code these 
statanents. jor categories in 'Which each group gave answers are 
tabulated in the following tables 
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TABLE VII 
UISSI<N OF NAVY FR<r.J SURVEY RESPCNSES 
otal 
Officers Enlisted Sample 
Code Cate~ary % % % 
Control of the seas 6.8 4.1 6.3 
Defend the United States 8.0 13.1 10. 7 
Aid Allies 6. 3 8.2 7.) . 
Provide logistic support 5. 9 4. $ .5.2 
Air attack frCin carriere 5 • .$ 2 .. 6 3.9 
Take offtmsive action 
'·' 
3.4 ~ -4 
Readiness to fight 5.1 5. 2 ,.2 
Keep sea lanes open 4.6 3.4 h.o 
Land U. s. forces 4.6 3.4 h.O 
Deter aggression and keep peace 3.0 6.0 4.6 
lft:4. ntain goodwill for United 
States 1.7 6.7 4.4 
other 38.9 27.4 32.6 
Don•t lmow 4.1 2.2 
No answer 2.1 7. 9 2·2 
- 'l'otal 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Uotet 44 officers, or 89.8%, gave answers in 2 o:r. more categories. 
62 enlisted) or 53.0~, " u " " " u n 
Both groups were fairly consistent in their types of answers in 
the above table "With relatively few in the 11don1 t know" and "no answer" 
categories. Of significance is the laok of high percentages in a.rrr 
catogar.y. Highest categories werea tor officers, "control of the 
seas" (8. 8%) and tor enlisted, "defend the u.s. n (13.1%) . Question 
wording, llherein the instruction was: "Discuss (mission) in detail 
as to roles, functions) reeponl!libUities, jobs, etc . Please do not 
say just •control of the seas'," probably accounted for the low 
numbers in this category. Also of significance ie the low percentage 
( offioera especially, 1. 7%) who mentioned "maintain goodJrill for the 
u.s." 
Analysis of this questicn offers an opportunity for a number of 
statistical analyses and correlations on frequencies, relationships 
of variables of education, time in Navy, socioeconan.io level, etc., 
all of which are beyond the immediate scope of this stu~ • 
In the interest-attituQe or motivational area of learning more 
about the Navy' a mission the following six questions were asked: 
1. Do you feel you have a good understanding of the missicn of 
the three mill tary serrtces? 
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2. Do you feel you have a good understanding of the Navy's mission 
or not? 
). Would you like to lmow more about the Navy• s mission or not? 
4. Do you feel the 1iaVy is tel.l1ng you enough about its mission? 
$. How do you think the part the Navy now playa canpares with 
that of World War II? 
6. What changes, if any, have the nation's leaders shown recentq 
in their attitudes about the importance of the Navy in a future conflict? 
7. Do you feel the Navy is receiving sufficient public recogni-
tion for the job it is doing in the Jledi terranean? 
Each of these questions was of the closed-end type. The first four 
will be discussed together because of the similarity of subject matter. 
Of prime importance in developing a atud;y plan on the mission and 
capability of the Navy is to learn something about the level of motiva-
tion people have for learning subject matter in this field. The best 
way for dete~ this seemed to be to ask t.bem. Heavy reliance, 
of course, mU8t be made on honest answers, so in order to facU1t&te 
this, the questicnnaires were kept anoeymoua. Table VIII presents 
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respondents• answers to these four questions. 
TABLE VIII 
INTml!ST-ATTITUDE QUESTI CN RESP<NSES CN KISSION 
AN DlDICATION OF OTIVATI <N FOR LEARNING 
Total 
Qu.esticns and Officers Enlisted Sanple 
Code Categoriee % ~ % 
1. Underatalding mission of three 
militaxy servicess 
HaTe little understanding 4.3 ,3.0 
HaTe SQI1e understanding 46.9 62. 4 57.8 
Have very good understanding 51.1 32.5 38.0 
No answer 2.0 .a 1.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 lOOeO 
2, Good understanding of Navy• a 
mission or nota 
Yes 89. 8 75.2 79. 5 
No 4.1 6. 8 6.0 
Undecided 4.1 17.1 13.3 
No answer 2.0 
·2 1.2 
Total roo.o ioo.o 100.0 
3. Would like to lmow more about 
the Navy' s mission or not: 
Yes 73. 5 76.1 75.3 
No 18. 3 16.2 16.9 
No arunrer ~1 
·2 1.8 Total roo.o 100.0 1oo.o 
4. Opinion on whether Navy is 
telling its people enough 
about the missions 
Yea 51.0 .34.2 .39.2 
No 42. 9 59.0 54.2 
Don' t knOW' .3.4 2.4 
No anmrer 6.1 J·~ 4.2 
Total ioo.o 100.0 100.0 
The significance of data in this table is primar:iJ3 in the high 
rate of officers who said thq have a good understanding of the Navy• s 
mission (90%) with 74 per cent interested in learnmg still more about 
the mission. The enlisted group indicated less satisfaction with their 
lmowledge of the mission (75%) but showed a three per cent higher 
interest level to learn. 
Question No. 4 indicates that about half of the officers ( Sl. o%) 
feel satisfied Tlith the Navy' s internal in.fonnation progran in regard 
to mission while enlisted men indicated they were not as pleased with 
the amount of infonnation they receive. In other words., 65. 8 per cent 
of enl isted would like more infonnati on on the Navy' s mission. 
Of interest in t his tabl e is to explore the reasons for the differ-
ences in understanding the missi on of the three militar,r services, the 
spread betwem the two groups in the "sane understanding" category being 
lS. S per cent. The questions here seem to be: 
1 . Do these figures represent r espondents' true feelings or are 
they the type of answers "expected" of them/ In other words, were 
respondents giving biased or true answers? 
2. Of what effect is the respondent• s frame of referEnce for 
basing his answer'l 
It is apparent that neither of these questions can be answered in this 
a.nalysis but are mentioned here for the sake of recognizing the limi-
tations and a terminal point for this analysis. 
The second group of three questi ons in the interest-attitude area 
were designed to measure respondents• evaluation of the worth, or 
importance., of the Navy gener~. From this sort of analYsis it seem• 
logical to infer, fran r eference group theor,r, the importance of "value" 
the respondent places upon his own membership in the group. In this 
smse then a greater public recognition for the Navy means greater 
personal satisfaction for its members. The results of these three 
questions are included in Table II. 
TABLE IX 
RESPOOD1iNTS1 F.VAIDATICN OF NAVY• S MISSIW• 
I!.tPORTANC~ A.. D RmOGNITIW RreEIVED 
Total 
Question and Officers Enlisted Sample 
Code Category % % 
1. Importance of the Nav,r•a rol e 
today compared with World 
War II: 
Greater now SS.l 65. 0 62.1 
About same 26. 5 2.4. 8 25.3 
Less tod.q 16. 4 9. 4 12.0 
Don•t know 
- -No answer 8 . 6 
Total 100. 0 100.0 100.0 
2. Attitude change of nation' s 
leaders toward importance 
of the N lf.'qt 
Decreased very much 1 . 7 1.2 
Decreased sane 10. 2 19. 6 16. 9 
No change 14. 3 13. 7 13. 9 
Increased same S5.1 34. 2 ~.4 
Increased very much 16. 3 26. 5 23.$ 
Don' t lmow 1. 7 1.2 
No answer ~.1 2. 6 3.0 
Total 100.0 100. 0 100.0 
3. Sufficient recognition given 
to Navy for job in 
Jlediterranearu 
Yea 59. 2 33.3 4l.O 
No 26. 5 37. 6 34.4 
Undecided 6.2 26.2 22.2 
Dontt lmow 
No answer 6.1 
·2 2.4 Total 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 
Results of question No. 1 in the table indicate that over half 
of both groups gave the Navy more importance today than in Vorld War II. 
Enlisted men evaluated the Navy' s importance to be greater, by 15 per 
cent, than did officers. Or converseq 1 twice as many officers as en-
listed felt that the Navy was less important today. Ro~ ~one­
fourth of both groups felt it had stayed at about the same l evel of 
importance. 
Question No. 2 respcnses indicated that about 10 per cent more 
officers (total of two 11increase!1 categories is 7l. h%) felt that 
there had been increased recognition of the Navy• s importance by the 
nation' s leaders. It is significant to note that exactlY the same 
percentage of officers (,5.1%) felt that Navy' s importance was "greater" 
in question No. 1 as said the nation's leaders showed "some increase" 
in the importance-of-the-Navy attitude in question No. 2. The Enlisted 
group favored the highest category of increase by 10 per cent more 
than the officer group and at the same time marked more often in the 
"decreased some" category by 9.4 per cent. Higher markings in t hese 
categories reduced the "increased sane" by 20. 9 per cent below the 
off icers. Evaluation of this question would indicate the officer group 
to be more conservative in evaluations at both extrEmes of the contiml'\De 
Question No. 3 indicates that more officers ( 26%) than enlisted 
feel satisfied that the Navy is receiVing sufficient recognition for 
the job it is doing in the Mediterranean. Additional significant infor-
mation is indicated in the "undecided" and "no anl!nfer" categories. 
'l'wice as many enlisted respondents checked these two categories as 
officers. 
Evaluation of these three questions indicate that enlisted men 
are more optimistic about the future il:l.portance of t he Navy rut, at the 
same time, are doubtful of the public recognition it receives. Officers 
on the other hand are more pes~d.mistic and conservative but believe 
that more recognition is given to the Navy in the areas tested. 
Responses ~ questions ~ capabilities. Seventeen questions were 
designed to measure the second half of the general objective of the 
survey, the degree of understanding of the Navy• s "capabUi ties. " The 
questions have been divided into three categories, as in the "mission" 
section above, for discussioo. purposes. Groupings used were similar-
fact, opinion, and interest-attitude categories. 
The siX fact questions designed to test lmowledge lavels in this 
-
area weres 
1 . Since World War II a number of scientific developnents have 
increased the ll e:vy' s power to wage war. What are scme of these? 
2. Do you happen to lmaw haw many nuclear powered subnar:lnes the 
Navy has in service and under ocnstructicn altogether? (Include those 
Congress has appropriated funds for . ) 
.3. How many subnarines do you think Russia has'l 
4. Does Russia have sny nuclear powered subnarines'l 
5. In lfbat country were the last amphibious landings made by the 
Navy under actual canbat condi tions'l 
6. What is the total distance the Navy• s newest carrier-based 
planes can f'1y? ( Tota1 of the mileage out and back. ) 
Responses to these questions are presented in Table I . 
l. 
2. 
TABLE X 
RESPCUSES TO FACT U TICNS Qf NAVY' S CAPABILITIES 
AN INDICATI CN OF Gl:NEaAL KNOOLEOOE LIYEL 
Quoeti one and Officers Enlisted 
Code Catesoriea % % 
Scientific developnents sinoe 
World ar !It 
Nuclear propulsion 26.2 13. 4 
Guided missiles 23.6 25. 5 
Jet aircraft 12.6 12.7 
Nuclear weapc:ns 7. 5 6. 0 
Improved guns and fire 
control systems, etc. 5. 2 6.7 
H-Banb 4.7 2. 6 
Improved radar, sccar, etc. 4.1 6. 3 
Super carriers 3. 5 11. 9 
Uisei1e ships 3. 5 2.2 
Rockets 2.9 4. 9 
other 5. 6 1.1 
Don•t lmow 1. 5 
No answer 5.2 
Total Ioo.o Ioo.o 
Nuclear subnarinos in service 
and under constructions 
3 subnarines 14. 3 28. 2 
6 subnarinos 36. 7 17.1 
9 It 20. 4 18. 8 
12 " 8. 2 4.3 
15 II 6. 2 4.3 
16 
" 
. 6 
21 
" 
5.1 
24 " - 1. 7 Don•t know 10.2 12.0 
No answer 2. 0 1·1 
Total 100. 0 100. 0 
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To al 
Sample 
% 
16. 4 
24.6 
12.7 
6.6 
6.1 
3. 4 
5. S 
6. 6 
2. 7 
4.1 
3. 0 
. 9 
~·2 
.o 
24.1 
22. 9 
19. 4 
5. 4 
S. 4 
.6 
3. 6 
1.2 
11. 4 
6.0 
100.0 
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TABL.E X (continued) 
Total 
Questions and Of!'icers F.hl.isted ~le Code Cates;oriee % % 
3. Estimate of number of Russian 
eub:ulrines: 
100 and under 2.0 3.4 3.0 
200 subnarines 12.3 5.1 7.2 
300 n 10. 2 4.3 6.o 
350 " 6.1 1. 8 400 n 26. 6 6. 8 12.7 
450 II 14.3 3.4 6.6 
500 " 8. 2 6.0 6.6 600 .. 2. 0 .a 1.2 
Uore than 60o 2.0 7.7 6.1 
ore than the Un1 ted 
States 2.0 5.1 4.2 
Other 2.6 1.8 
Don' t know 12. 3 42.8 33. 8 
No answer 2.0 12.0 ~·0 Total roo.o Ioo.o r-.o 
4. Does Russia have aqy nuclear 
powered su.l:marines?: 
Yes 8. 2 38. 5 29.5 
No 77.5 35.9 48. 2 
Don' t lmaw 10. 2 20.5 17. 5 
No answer 4.1 5.1 4. 8 
Total !oo.o 100.0 too.o 
5. Country lfh.ere Navy made last 
attphibious landings in canbatt 
Korea 87. 8 37. 5 52.4 
Okinawa 2.0 3. 4 3.0 
Iwo Jima 2.7 1. 8 
other 2.0 9.4 7.2 
Don' t Imow 4.1 29 .1 21.7 
No answer 4.1 17 .2 12·2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
TABL~ X (continued) 
Questions and 
Code Categories 
6. Longest range of carrier 
based planes: 
11 000 mil es and under 
1- 000 to 1- 500 
1,500 to 21 000 
21 000 to 31 000 
3,000 to 4, 000 
4,000 to 5, 000 
Over 5,000 
Don' t know 
No anmrer 
Total 
Officers 
~ 
8. 2 
8. 2 
12.3 
.30.6 
6.1 
6.1 
6.1 
16. 3 
6.1 
100.0 
Enlisted 
% 
100. 0 
Total 
Sample 
% 
100. 0 
Question No. 1 :indicates the general l evel of awareness of major 
changes in ships, planes and armament which hs:ve taken place since the 
end of or1d War II. All officers in the sample gave answers in two 
or more categories. A similar check showed that 78. 6 per cent of 
enlisted mentioned two or more scientific developnents. Nuclear pro-
pulsi on was mentioned most frequently by officers ( 26. 2%) While guided 
missUee were mmtioned most often ( 25.5~) by the enlisted group. 
!tans mentioned in second place were just the inverse of these. 
Question No. 2 was designed to test knowl edge of cuiTent infor-
mation on the Navy• a atanic powered subnarine capability, the fastest 
changing area of ship propulsi on. The figures published for use by 
the 1957 Armed Forces Day epokeamen (Jiay 18, 1957) listed the Nautilus 
and a "total of fourteen more nuclear powered subm.ar:tnes. n 
hgpeakers ' Guide !2£. Service Spokesnen, Armed Forces Day, 1957, 
issue (\' ashingtont u. s. Governmmt I'rinting Office, 1957), P• 10. 
The third atomic propelled Slbltarine, the Skate, was launched at 
Groton, Com., on Uay 181 1957, just three weeks before respondents 
were given questionnaires. This ceremony was Widely publicized by 
5 
military and civilian news media. In view of these develoiDents it 
was expected that most of the respcndents would check in either the 
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"3" or "15" category. Instead, most of the officers (36.7%) thought 
the Navy bad six atanic subnarines while the Enlisted gro~ (28. 2%) 
indicated they thought there were only three. Of significance was the 
fact that neither group was close to the actual number of 15 sul:marines 
( ~ 8. 2% of officers and 4.3% of enlisted selected this category). 
The "don' t knows" and "no answers• were relatively high at 12.2 per 
cent for officers and 19.7 per cent for enlisted. 
Question No. 3 is another question in the current affairs category 
of knowledge lovel meaeurement. S"8Crete.ry of the Navy Thomas has 
frequently mentioned the figure UOO as the number of submarines Russia 
has. The press has l'eported this figure m&niY' times in the past year. 
Admiral Jeraul.d Wright, Cazc.ander in Chief Atlantic and u.s. Atlantic 
Fleet, hen discussing antisutmarine capabilities before the Overseas 
Press Club, said: "these (fieet) units are few ••• to acconnt for the 
6 
lJ)O Soviet submarines of today and their 85 per year increase." 
Of significance in these answers were the tremendously Wide range 
s !!!!z Times, April 20, 1957. !!!!z Times, the most Widely' read 
newspaper devoted to Navy news, carried a United Press story with 
dateline of January 18, 1957, on subnarines in which it reported, "The 
Navy nw has 15 atanic subnarines either authorized, under construction, 
or ca:npleted." The same article indica ted that four more are in budget 
r~ests for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1957. 
6 
Jerauld Wright, Admiral, USN, "NATO Presentation Before the Over-
seas Press Club of AJnerica," Karch 28, 1956, !!!!z Public Statements 
(Washingtont Department of the Navy, 1956), P• 24. 
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of responses given by enlisted mon. Answers varied fran "6 or 7" to 
"4,000 to 5,000." The table clearly shows that none of the code 
groups named by enlisted respondents were near the 1.&00 category. In 
fact, these respondents spread their an8111ers fairly eve~ in other 
categories l'fith most of them (54.8%) in the "don' t know" and "no 
answer" groups. The officers :indicated a fair knowledge of this 
itEm but only 40.9 per cent clustered their answers into the }t)o and 450 
categories. The next highest officer groups were in the 200 and 300 
range With 14.3 per cent in the "don ' t kn01J" and "no answer" categories. 
Question No. 4 produced interesting enlisted responses in view of 
the fact that no publicity one-way-or-the-other in regard to Russian 
atomic sul:marines has been reported in the press or made in speeches 
recently to the knowlcdce of this writer. The presumption then is 
that Russia does ~ have any ata:dc subnarines. The significant fact 
here is that the largest category of the enlisted group (38. 5%) 
believed that Russia doe11 have nuclear powered sul:marines. The "don't 
-
kncms" and "no answers" here, again, add up to more than one-fourth 
of the enlisted sample. 
Question No. 5 was designed to test the sauple :in the current 
affairs area of anphibious warfare capability. The officer group 
indicated a high level awareness of this fact. The Navy's last am:phib-
ious landing under combat condi tiona !:!! made in Korea. Of great signifi-
cance is the large percentage of enlisted "don' t knows" and "no answers. " 
Question No. 6 was included to see how Navymen were keeping up- to-
date on tho long-distance flying range (capability) of new planes operating 
fran carriers. During orld ar II, the range of carrier planes was in the 
area of 100 to 800 miles. Today' s planes have an unrefueled range of 
7 
31000 miles. This question proved especially significant because 
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juSt four days before the survey was placed in the field two SlcylraiTior, 
medium jet banbers, new non- stop fran the carrier Bon Hanme Richard in 
the Pacific and landed on the USS Saratoga in the Atlantic. The preBB 
reported this event as "the first ocean-to-ocean carrier night in 
8 
history." It was part of a demonstration of the Navy' s capability 
in air striking power put on before President Eisenhower and members 
of his cabinet. These events may have helped the officer group to 
answer this question but, even so, the 30. 6 per cent appears lov for 
this group in light of the above circumstances. The mlisted group 
'\Vas extremel.y J:2! percmtage-Wise lfith 6 . 8 per cent in the •2, 000 to 
31 000" mile category. Lack of awareness of the range of ~avy planes 
after the ocean- to-ocean danonstr ation is considered to be one of the 
most significant findings in the BUI'Yey. Jiaas media news of these 
ovmts either did not reach these people, or they didn' t associate 
the question with these events, or they were not interested enough to 
read about this kind of news. The high percentage of "don' t knows" and 
"no answers" in both groups bas considerable significance. 
In the opinion area r egarding capabilities six questions were used 
7 
Charles s. Tha:Las, former Secretary of the Navy 1 in a speech 
before the Symington Subcanittee, United States Senate, June 26, 1956, 
~ Public Statements, August, 1956 ( ashington: Department of the 
Navy, 1956), P• 1 • 
8 
By the Associated Press in the Boston Dail.y Globe 1 June 71 
19571 P• 1. 
as measuring tools. 
1 . Do you think the aircraft carrier is becoming more important 
in t he event of a future war or lees ~portant? 
2. Which weapon of any of the three military services do you 
think would be the ~ important single weapon in a future war? 
3. List as many things yoo think the Navy could do to stop the 
enemy and bring victory. Include as many major warfare activities 
or jobs as possible. 
4. Do you know what a hunter-killer group is? 
5. What do you think is the primary job of a hunter- killer group? 
6. The Navy's new atanic weapons have caused sane change 1n its 
capabilities since orld War II. How much change do you think bas 
taken place1 
Table II contains the survey responses to these questions. 
51 
TABLE XI 
OPINI(l{ RESPQlSES TO QUFSTICNS Q( NAVY' S CAPABILITIES 
Total 
Questicns and Officers & listed Sample 
Code Categories ~ % % 
1. Importance of carriers in a 
future wart 
Jlore important 81.6 87.2 8$.6 
Leas important 4.1 5.1 4. 8 
Same 12.3 3. 4 6.0 
Don•t lmow 2. 0 2.6 2. 4 
No answer 1.7 1.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2. Host important single weapon 
of three mili tary services: 
UissUes ( ICB ost 
mentioned) 38.8 34. 2 35. 6 
H- Ban.b 16.3 9. 4 u.s 
Jet planes 6. 8 4.8 
Rifle (or foot eoldier) 12. 2 4.3 6.6 
tissUe subnarine 8. 3 3. 4 4.8 
A tanic weapons 6.1 11.1 9.7 
Not one--all are important 6.1 1.7 3.0 
Long rangebanbers of SAC** 4.1 6.0 5.4 
Moral e ot men 2.0 . 6 
Carriers . 8 .6 
other 4.1 6.0 5. 4 
Don • t know and undecided 6.0 4.2 
No answer 2.0 10.~ 7.8 
Total too.o t()).o rex>.o 
*Intercontinental ballistic missile (u.s. Air Force) 
**Strategic Air COII1:1&Ild1 U. s. Air Force 
) . Things to do to stop the enEII!y and 
bring victory' 
12. 4 Control the seas 1.8 7.0 
Attack Wit h carrier planes 11.9 9. 0 10. 4 
Amphibious warfare 1o. o 4.1 7.0 
Jfi.ssile warfare 8.6 8.1 8 • .) 
Antisubnarine warfare 7.1 5.9 6. 5 
Destroy enemy shipping 4.8 4.1 4.4 
Logistic support 4.7 2.7 3. 7 
Shore ban.bardmmt 4.3 4.1 4. 2 
TABLE XI (continued) 
Total 
Questions and Officers Ehlisted S7le 
Code Catesories % % 
Radar warning 4.3 2.7 3.5 
Control sul:marines 3.8 2 • .3 3.0 
Escort ccnvoys 3.8 1.8 2.8 
Offensive attack 3.3 7.2 5.3 
Provide canbat support 3.3 1.4 2.3 
Defend the United States 3.3 1.8 2.6 
Readiness for combat 2.9 3.6 3.4 
other 8.1 14.5 11.4 
Don•t lmow .s 9.1 4.9 
No anner 2.2 12.8 2·2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: 87.8~ of officers gave answers in 2 or more categories. 
41.9% of enlisted " II n n n " tl 
4. Know what a hunter-kU.ler group 
1st 
Yes 95.9 65.0 74.1 
No 2.0 .30.0 21.7 
Don•t lmow 2.1 2.5 2.4 
No answer 2.2 1.8 
Total ioo.o 100.0 100.0 
5. Primary job of a h\Blter-killer 
groups 
Detect and destroy-
subnarines 91.8 44. 4 58.4 
Seek out and destroy enaDT 4.1 18.8 14.5 
Don't lmow 2.0 24.8 18.7 
No answer 2.1 12.0 8.~ 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
6. Rating the degree of change in 
capabilities due to atomic 
weapons: 
L1 ttle change 2.0 o.8 1.2 
Moderate change 8.2 15.2 13.3 
Great change 55.1 $2.1 53.0 
Very great change 34.7 29.1 30.7 
Don't lmaw 
-
. 9 .6 
No answer 1.7 1.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Results of questic:n No. 1 support and affirm other statements 
made by Navy officials9 that carriers are continuing to be of major 
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importance in any possible future war. An announcement has been made 
10 
that the first atomic powered carrier lt'ill be in operation by 1961. 
Doth groups are practically equal in their high rating or the aircraft 
carrier• s importance. The enlisted men gave it a slightly higher 
mark ( 87 . 2%) as compared to the officers ( 81. 6.-) . This was a closed-
end question with four cbeck-categoriee given. 
Question No. 2 was designed to see whether avymen would choose 
a weapon especial.ly designed for naTal warfare as the most important, 
or one frOI:l the other services. It as felt that a great deal could 
be learned about their general knowledge and thinking about mill tary 
capabilities f'rom responses made to this open- end question. Answering 
this question is admitted]J difficult When there is such an array of 
destructive weapons now available to u.s. military forces . It is 
Bif?1lificant to note that both groups rated "missiles" more than twice 
as often as other weapms. In this category the intercontinental 
11 
ballistic missile was mentic.ned specifically a number of times. 
9Arleigh A. Burke, Acbiral, u~, Chief of Naval Operations in answer 
to an interview question about the change in attitude toward carriers 1n 
recent years said: "I think that people have started to reco~ize the 
importance or the carrier and what ehe can do as an important part of 
the t otal Unit ed States air power. " "H- Banb Cannot ipe Out the u. s. 
Navy," !!• ~· ~ ~ V orld Report, y 4, 1956, P• 86. 
lO Army avz~ir Force Register, June 8, 1957 (p. 5) , carried an 
article in Which it said: "'lhe Navy baa requested funds for construc-
ticn of an atanic powered carrier in the 1958 program and five more 
after that. Late in the 1961 calendar year, the Navy Ydll have ita 
first atomic-powered carrier in operation." 
~e intercontinental ballistic missile (5,()()().onlle) is assigned 
to tho Air Force. The longest range miesile assigned to the Navy ie a 
1500-mUe ballistic missile, "Decision on JfissUes," Time Uagazine, 
Decanber 10, 1956, P• 25. -
S4 
Also of note was that officers ranked the rifle (or foot soldier) as 
the third most important weapon (after missiles and the H•banb but 
before the missile subnarine) . Ehlisted men ranked the rifle as 
fourth moat important. The "don't knows" and "no answers" were rela-
tive~ low peroentagewise. 
The third question in this series was designed as t he most crucial 
measurement. It attempted to measure the understanding men had of the 
Navy' s capabilities. As in the general question on "mission" it pre-
sented probl~s in coding due to the largo number of categories. Here 
in the ana.l¥sie stage it is d1ff1cult to assess the degree of under-
standing men have of this area. The question as deliberateJ,y reworded 
at the last minute before the pretest to eliminate the word ••capabilities" 
'fthich, in the opinion of several naval officers, was too abstract to be 
read.i.l\r understood by the majority of respondents. The heavy overlap 
of five categories between this question nnd the one on "misaim" {see 
Table VII) indicates respondents had either a hazy mental distinction 
between the tm abstract terms or the questim was poor:cy worded (low 
validity) . Categories mentioned by respondents in both questions are 
in the percentages indicated in this tabu1ation: 
Capab1litiea Mission 
Code itans Officers In listed Officers Enlisted 
% % % % 
Control of the 
seas 12.4 1.8 8.8 4.1 
Attack With oar-
rier planes 11.9 9.0 s.s 2.6 
Logistic &pport 4.7 2.7 S.9 4.$ 
Defend the u. s. 3.3 1.8 8.0 13.1 
Readiness for 
can bat 2.2 3.6 S.l $.2 
55 
The first of these five items, control of the seas, of course is 
the prilr.ary over- all mission of the Navy. If respondents, in mention-
ing, control of the seas, under "things to do to stop the enEI!Iy" in the 
capabilities section were actually referring to the abilitY) or capa-
bili ty 1 then they woul d be displaying a high level understanding of the 
tam "capabilities." This is not cl ear, however, from the r esponses 
given. 11Capability11 as mentioned in the earlier part of this etu~ is 
taken to mean abUi ty to take action in a specific area of warfare and 
usually for sustained periods of time. Respondents very selda::l indi-
cated this clearly in responses but merely ment i oned weapons, planes, 
shipo, etc., without sqing !!!!!!: should be done with them, or ~ 
they should be used in warfare. The question: "List as many things 
you think the Navy could do to stop the enemy and bring Victory. 
-
Include as many major -warfare activiti es or jobs as poesibl e, n was 
considered sufficiently clear in this regard. The only conclnsion, 
thEn, appears to be a l ack of clear understanding between the two 
terms. Similar discussions could be advanced for the other four 
cros~entioned categories. 
In the interest-attitude, or moti vational, area of learning about 
the Navy• s capabilities, six questions were asked. 
1. Bach new weapon is designed to fit into tho over - all capabilitY' 
of the Navy. Do you feel fairly certain that you know how each WC?ul d 
be used in battle? 
2. How well do you feel that you are kept informed about the 
capabilit ies of the Navy re8Ulting fro:n new weapons"l 
3. lfhat percentage of the worl d ' s land would you guess can now 
be r eached by carrier-based pl anes? 
4. Do yoo happen to kno whether or not the Navy can launch 
guided missilos from submarines? 
S. l'wo of the ·avy' s experimental jet seaplanes crashed 
recently. Do you know if the t. avy- is continuing to develop this plane 
or not'l 
6. In yaur opinicn, is the Navy- giving its people enough train-
ing on tho mission and capabilities? 
Responses to these questi ons are presented in Table XTI. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
TABLB XII 
mTFnEST-ATTITUDE Ql'JES'l'I!:N RESPGiSES Ql GA ")~ BILITI ES 
At~ lNDICATial OF OTIVATI<ll FOR LfARNJNG 
Questions and Officer Ehlisted 
Code C,ategoriee % ~ 
Certainty of' knowing how new 
weapons would bo used in 
battle: 
Don' t lmow 10.2 1.4.5 
Not sure 34.7 43.6 
Fairly sure 44. 9 .38. 5 
VfrrYsure 8. 2 .a 
No answer 2. 0 2.6 
Total 100.0 100. 0 
How wall respondent feels he 
is kept informed about Navy 
capabilities: 
L1 ttle informPd 24.5 41.0 
edium well informed 53.1 49. 6 
Well informed 20.4 6. 8 
Don' t know 
Uo answer 2.0 2. 6 
Total 100:0 100. 0 
Percentage of world' s land 
area that can be reached by 
carrier-based planes: 
Up to 25t<~ 2. 0 2.6 
2' to 50% 8. 2 ll. l 
5o to 75% 28.6 29 . 9 
75 to 100~ 57.1 47 .0 
Don' t know 3. 4 
No answer ~.1 6.0 
Total 100. 0 100.0 
1 avy sulmarine missile 
oapabilityf 
Can be launched 89. 8 01. 2 
Cannot be launched 1. 7 
Don' t know 8. 2 16. 2 
No answer 2. 0 
·2 
'l'otal 100. 0 100. 0 
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•rotal 
Sample 
% 
13. 3 
L0.9 
40. 4 
3. 0 
2. 4 
100. 0 
36.1 
50.7 
10.6 
2. 4 
100.0 
2.4 
10. 2 
29.5 So.l 
2. 4 
2·~ 100. 0 
83.7 
1. 2 
1.3. 9 
1. 2 
100.0 
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TABLE XII (continued) 
Total 
Questions and Officers Enlisted Sample 
Code Cate~ories % % % 
5. Seaplane developnent program 
(Seamaster): 
Continuing to develop 69.4 44.4 51. 8 
Decided to drop 2. 7 1.8 
Don1t lmow 30.6 !)2.9 U6.4 
No answer 
Total 1oo.o 100.0 100.0 
6. N aTy giving its people enough 
training on the missi on and 
capabUities?t 
Yes 28.6 23.1 24.7 
No 53.1 35.0 40.3 
Undecided 12.2 40.2 32.0 
Don' t lmow 
- -No answer 6.1 1.7 2·0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Question No. 1 was provided with four alternative check-categories 
to :make it easy for respondents to answer and to facilitate the later 
coding and tabllating process. By additional grou.ping now of the first 
two and last two, it is noted that 44.5 per cent of officers and 58.1 
per cent of enlisted acknowledge that they did not have too good an 
understanding of the way the Navy would use its new weapons. These 
percentages are ccnsidered to be low 1n relation to the large percent-
age in each category that said they bad a good understanding of the 
Navy' s mission (89.8% of officers and 75.2% of enlisted). In the 
officer group 15.5 per cent had also served overseas since World ar II. 
Question No. 21 another closed- end question, was designed as a 
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cross-check on the reliability of responses given in question No. 1. 
The two questions were spaced five questions apart in the questionnaire. 
The second was a self-rating question on opinions regarding their own 
knowledge level of the Navy' s capabilities. By comparing responses of 
these two questions, it is noted that on~ 24. 5 per cent of officers 
said they were "little informed" canpared to 44.5% of "don• t knon" 
and "not sures11 in No. 1. Forty-one per cent of the enlisted men said 
they were "little informed" as canpared to 58.1 per cent in tbe uncer-
ta.inty areas of weapon usage. 
Question lio • .3 provided another check on interest-attitudes by 
asking respondents to consider the world-wide operating, or mobility 
area, of the Navy in terms of the percentage of the land mass that 
could be reached by carrier aircraft. Higher percentages of responses 
were expected in the "75 to 100%" category than those received (57 .1% 
for officers and 47 . o% for :anlisted) . This was due to the tact that 
three-fourths o£ the world is water in which the NaV7 operates, plus 
the .3,000-mUe range of carrier-based planes. A stu~ o£ geographical 
· land masses leaves only a relatively snall area of Russia out of range 
of carrier-based planes. 
Question No. 4 indicates that a higher percentage of both groups 
12 
know this part of the Navy's capability in subnarine warfare. 
Question No. 5 produced a high percentage of responses in the 
12 Sane of this high percentage may have resulted from an article 
appearing in the Army-Navy...Air Force Register, June 8, 1957, in regard 
to the 2425-ton guided missile sul:marine USS Barbero joining the Inter-
national Naval Review (June 12) in Hampton Roads, Va. 
60 
officer group who knew (69.4%) bu:t l ees than half (44. 4%) of enlisted 
knew the answer to this question . Press statements made by Navy offi-
cials shortly after the second jet seaplane crashed indicated that the 
liavy would continue to develop this plane. Numerous otmr articles 
have appeared in military ne\Yspapers regarding tests and developn.ent 
plans for this plane since that time. The large (52. 9%) number of 
"don' t knows" in the enlisted group mq be due to the high percentage 
of this group ( 26 • .5!') who were in the 11under-one-year" category of 
experience in the Navy • 
Question No. 6 is significant in that it indicates that about 
three- fourths of both groups feel that tile Navy is~ giving its peopl e 
enough training in the areas of mission and capabilities, or are neutral 
in the "undecided" category. Only' one-fourth were positive enough to 
mark the 11yes" category. 
In smmnary, Tabl e III indicates that interests of both groups was 
the highest and most ocnsistent in regard to the potential capabilities 
of the r.:dssile subnarine and at the lowest knowledge level in use of 
new weapons. Fran comparison of questi on No. 6 in this table with No. 4 
in Tabl e VIII (opinion on Whether Navy is telling people enough aboot 
the mission) an indication is noted that the enlisted group would like 
more information an ~ mission and capabilities. Officers are more 
interested in leB.rning about capabilities as indicated by the signifi-
cant change of 51.0 per cent •7es" on sufficiency of missi on information 
to 28. 6 per cent 9 yes" on training in capabilities . 
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Sources 2! information. Of major interest in anal¥sis of J:nowledge, 
or information levels, for use in improving education is to investigate 
sources of the individual • s information. Also of :interest is to receive 
opinions and ideas from the group on what kind of information and hOlf' 
it feels that most training should be given in these areas. \Vith these 
objectives in mind a number of questions were constructed in three 
broad areas: fact (sources of information), opinion (on effectiveness), 
and interest-attitude (suggestions for future training). 
In the fact area three questions were ccnstructed to find out 
-
Where respondents got most of their information and to learn something 
of their reading habits. 
1 . Where do you get most of :rour information about the Navy? 
-
2. Special lectures on the increasing importance of t he Navy 
are being given at many cCllllllands. The lecture is illustrated With a 
series of color slides sholling new developnents and capabili tiee of 
the Navy. Have you seen this presentation? 
3. Hem often do you read articles on the following topics: 
Navy's role in peacetime? 
Navy• s role in wartime'l 
Sea power? 
New weapons? 
National strategy of the U. S. ? 
Articles on NATO~ SEATO, and 
similar military pacts? 
Responses received to these three questions a r e presented in Tab~e XIII. 
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TABLE XIII 
RESP<llD:ENTG' SOORCES OF JUFORHATICN AND READ:lliG HABITS 
Total 
Questions and Officers Enlisted Sample 
Code Categories % % % 
1. Sources of moat information 
about the Navy: 
!!!!Z Times 16.2 17.3 16.9 
Navy bureau publications 15.6 5. 2 ?.2 
All Hands magazine 12.2 19.4 16.6 
Time Magazine 10.8 3.0 6.1 
People 4.7 6.5 5.8 
Newsweek Magazine 4.1 1.7 2.6 
N - Radio 2.0 4.8 3.1 
~aval Institute Proceedings 
(Nag.) 2.0 . 8 
.Q!g ~ Magazine . 7 7.8 5.0 
U. s. ~ !!!2 World Report 
· 7 · 9 .8 
.Am-Navz Register . 7 
·3 
Other newspapers 12.8 16.5 15.0 
other magazines 12.8 10.0 10.6 
Books ( Bluejackets llanual., 
etc.) . 9 .s 
No answer 4.7 6.9 6.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes 83. 7% of officers gave answers in 2 or more categories. 
61.5% of enlisted " " " " " n " 
2. Have seen special sea pOlTer 
presentation: 
Yes 16.3 12.0 13.3 
No 77.6 84.6 82.5 
No answer 6.1 3. !1 ~~ Total 100.0 100.0 
3. Frequency of reading articles 
an mission and capabilities: 
N avyt a role in peacetioe--
Never 2.0 17.1 12.6 
Sanetimes 65.3 63. 2 63.9 
Orten 26.5 12.0 16.3 
No answer 6.2 7.7 7.2 
Navy's role in wartime-
Never 16.3 12.0 13.3 
Sometimes 42.9 47.0 45.8 
Otten 34.7 30.7 31.9 
No answer 6.1 10.3 9.0 
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TABLE XIII (continued) 
Questicne and Officers Enlisted 
Code Categories % ~ 
Sea power-
Never 6.1 12. 0 10.2 
Saneti.mes 55.1 45.3 48.3 
Often .30. 6 33. 3 32. 5 
No answer 8.2 9. 4 9.0 
New weapons--
Never 15.4 10. 8 
Scmetimes 42. 9 47 . 9 46. 4 
Often 51. 0 28.2 34.9 
No answer 6.1 8. 5 7. 9 
National strategy of U.s.-
Never 6.1., 29. 9 22. 8 
Sanetimes 57.2 42.7 47.0 
Otten 30. 6 12.0 17.5 
No answer 6.1 1.5. 4 12.7 
NATO, SEATO, and similar pacts--
Never 6.1 40. 2 30.1 
Sometimes 71.4 .:;5.1 45.8 
Otten 1.4. 3 6. 8 9.0 
No answer 8. 2 17.9 15.1 
The table shOlfs that officers mentioned !!!z Times, the civilian 
wee~ newspaper, most often as one of their sources of infomation 
while enlisted mentioned the official Navy publication, ,ill Hands 
magazine (a monthly published by t he BUreau of Naval Persorme1) • 
Second and third in importance to officers were1 official publications 
and ill Hands. For enlisted the seccnd and third places were: !!!Z 
Times and ~ ~ magazine ( oivilian) . Officers listed ~ magazine 
as fourth ~e enlisted mentioned "people. " 
The second question is of value to see how far the special internal 
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informati on campaign on .!!:! power has progressed since it was inaugurated 
more than a year ago. Teans of officers have been giving this illustrated 
presentation at a number of installations, and the Bureau of Naval 
Personnel bas set it up in all school s under their control. If the per-
centage figures here apply to the entire Navy, more than 83, 000 officers 
and men have seen this presentation to date. The sea power presentation 
is the major effort now unde~ to educate people on the mission and 
capabilities of the Navy. 
Question No. 3 indicates reading habits in areas involving naTal 
affairs. Most check- responses were in the "sometimes" read oategor.y. 
The officer group listed articles on NATO and SEATO most frequently 
while the enlisted group indicated "Navy' s peacetime role" interested 
them the most. Second and third in each group were: for officers, 
the "Navy• s peacetime roletl and "national strategy-;" and for enlisted 
men, "new weapons" and ''Navy• s wartime role. n 
In the area of opinion measurement c:n effectiveness of various 
educational methods and channel s of information, a series of nine 
questions were c<nstructed. 
1 . Do you think ship and station newspapers are effective or 
ineffective in keeping persormel Wormed about the Navy? 
2. Do you send your ship' s newspaper bane to your fam.ily or 
friEnds? 
3. Sane service personnel feel that there is a great anount ot 
information availabl e !rom official Navy publications. Do you agree 
With this? 
4. Are official Navy publications availabl e to you 'When you want 
to read them? 
6S 
S. In your opinion, half' do you think ldves of naval personnel 
feel about the amount of informaticn they are getting about the Navy? 
6. If married, do you think it would help you in your ork if 
your Tlife knew more about the Navy? 
7. The television programs called "Victory at Sea" and "N a:vy Log" 
have been proc:hlced frcm Navy background material. Have you seen either 
of these programs'l 
8. Haw effective do you think these programs are in tell1ng the 
public about the Navy'l 
9. How do you feel about the anount of infonnation tbe Navy gives 
you about what ' s going on within the serV'ice'l 
Questim responses for this series are presented in Table XIV. 
1 . 
2. 
TABLE IIV 
OPmi<E RESP<ESES <B EFFIDTIVI!}{ESS OF :mFO:RUATIC!i KIIDIA 
AND EOOCATICN liETHODS 
Questions and Officers Fnliated 
Code Categories % % 
EffectivEness of ship and 
station newspaperst 
Effective 22.4 48. 7 
Ineffective 49.0 z6.S 
Undecided 24.S 21. 4 
No answer y.l 3. 4 
Total 100. 0 100.0 
Send ship • s newspaper hemet 
Never 63.1 62. 3 
Scmetimee 28. 6 24.0 
Otten 2. 0 6.0 
No answer 6.1 7.7 
Total ioo.o 100.0 
otal 
S7le 
41.0 
3.3.1 
22.3 
;!. 6 
100.0 
62.7 
2S.3 
4.6 
1·2 ioo.o 
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TABLE XIV (continued) 
Total 
Questions and Officers Jhl.ieted S'?le Code Categories % % 
3. Agreement on statement about 
"great atlount" of infor.nation 
being available in Navy pub-
licationss 
Yes 85.7 73. 5 77.1 
No 10.2 19. 7 16.9 
Don' t lmow .a .6 
No answer 4.1 6. 0 5.!l 
Total 100.0 100. 0 100.0 
4. Availability of Navy pub11-
cations when men want to 
read them: 
Yes 81.7 48. 7 56.5 
No 10.2 40.1 31.3 
Undecided 2.0 2. 6 2. 4 
No answer 6.1 8. 6 7. 8 
Total 100.0 100. 0 100.0 
5. How Wives feel about amount of 
information they are reeeiTing 
about the Navy: 
Would like more 57.2 51.3 53.1 
Have enough 30.6 20. 5 23. 5 
Oettoo much now 2.0 14.5 10. 8 
Don' t know 7.7 5. 4 
No answer 10.2 6. 0 7.2 
Total ioo.o Ioo.o 100.0 
6. ould help husbands if wives 
knew more about the Navy1 
26.5 Yes 38. 9 2l. 4 
No 22. 4 12. 8 15.7 
Sane 10.2 7. 7 8. 4 
Yuch 
Don•t know 2.0 4.3 3.6 
Not married 20.4 45.3 38. 0 
No answer 6.1 6.5 1·8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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'l'ABLE XIV (continued) 
oal 
estions and Officers Fhlisted Sample 
Code CateGories % ~ % 
7. Knowledge of "Victory at Sea" 
and "Navy Log" television 
programs: 
Have seen one 6.1 12. 0 10.2 
Have seen both 69. 6 83.8 85.6 
Have not seen either 4.3 .3. 0 
- 4.1 No anmrer 1. 2 
Total ioo.e 100.0 100.0 
8. Effectiveness o£ 'N programs 
in telling public about liavys 
Not effective 4. 2 2.9 
Fairly effective 57. 6 47 .$ 50. 6 
Very effective 36.5 16. 6 43. 0 
"ll avy Log" not very 
effective 1.9 1.7 1.7 
Don•t know .a ·. 6 
No answer 3.8 1.2 
Total 100.6 100.0 100.0 
9. Feeling about amount o! 
information Navy gives 
personnel about what is 
going on: 
Receive too much 8. 2 2.6 4.2 
Not enough 38.8 61. 5 54.9 
Right amount 46.9 31.6 36.1 
Don' t know . 9 . 6 
No answer 6.1 3. 4 ~.2 
Total ioo.o 100.0 100.0 
Question No. 1 is an excellent illustration of differences in 
evaluating the importance of' ship and station newspapers. Both groups 
were about equal.ly divided, 50 per cent of each taking opposite views 
in their evaluations. Most officers rated these newspapers ineffective 
'While the enlisted group showed more confidence in their effectiveness. 
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It is significant that only 48.7 per cent of the enlisted group felt 
that these newspapers were effective. 
Question No. 2 shOlfS significant results due to slightly more 
(4.8%) officers who "sa:tet:imea" send their ship's newspaper h<me 
even though they were the morrt outspoken about the ineffectiveness of 
these papers. 
Question No. 3 shows both groups agreed that a ttgreat anount" of 
information is available fran Navy official publications. 
Question No. 4 indicates that enlisted men do not have as great 
an opportunity to see official publications as do officers. This lack 
of availability was mentioned in canments both groups made to the final 
question on suggestions for improvement in training methods. 
About half of both groups hl question No. 5 f.elt that their wives 
would like to receive more information about the Navy. Responses by 
officers to question No. 6 is significant in that almost It:> per cent 
said it Y{ould be helpful to then in their careers if their wives lmw 
more about the Navy. This is over half of the 7 5.5 per cent married 
officers in the sample. 
Questions No. 7 and 8 indicate that high percentages (in 80-90% 
bracket) of both groups bad seen both "Victory at Sea" and "Navy U>g" 
television programs. &t, in the second question, which was not worded 
well (because respondents had to give one answer for effectiveness of 
~ programs) 1 moat officers rated thest9 shows as only "fairl,y 
effective." Some respondents, however, wrote in another category 
for "Navy U>gn and marked it "not effective" and gave"Victory at Sea" 
a "very effective'' rating. 
In question No. 9 the highest percentage of officers (46.9%) felt 
that the Navy is telling them about the right amc:mnt of l"lbat is going 
on. Thl.s is not a high percentage in view of what it could be. The 
enlisted group gave almost twice as m.any "not enough" marks as the 
next highest category. This wO\Ud tend to indicate they gelt stron~ 
about the lack of information. 
In the interest-attitude area of the questionnaire two questions 
were used. 
1. Where do you think that most of the instruction on the Navy• a 
mission and capabilities shou1d be given? 
2. \That are your suggestions on new ways of keeping personnel 
inforo.ed about the mission and capabilities of the Navy? 
Table XV contains respcnse results to these questions. 
TABLE XV 
lNTEREST~TTITUDE RESP<NSES m TRAlNlNG PROGRAJIS 
FOR NAVAL PERSOOEL 
Questions and 
Code Categories 
1. Tlhere to give most of the 
instruction on mission and 
capabilities: 
In schools 
On-the-job 
Both 
other 
Don•t know 
No answer 
Total 
2. Suggestions on new ~s to keep 
personnel informed about the 
mission and capabilities# 
Yore lectures 
Show more films 
More instruction 
J4otivate people to learn 
Fill:ts before theater movies 
Jlore training on job 
Regular briefings for crew 
~ider distribution of present 
material 
Explain ship' s mavanents to 
crew 
Use required training time 
Release more information 
More demonstrations 
Indoctrinate wives 
Present methods O. K. 
other 
Don' t know and "none" 
No answer 
Total 
Officers 
% 
10. 2 
22. 4 
55.2 
2. 0 
6.1 
4.1 
100. 0 
17. 9 
10. 3 
7.7 
7.7 
6.4 
3. 8 
2.6 
2.6 
2.6 
1. 3 
1 • .3 
1 • .3 
1. 3 
1. 3 
19.1 
1 • .3 
n .5 
100. 0 
Ehl.isted 
% 
5.1 
100.0 
17.6 
1.3. 2 
2.5 
1.3 
1.9 
2.5 
3.1 
.6 
1.9 
1e3 
12.6 
20.8 
11. 3 
100. 0 
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Total 
Sample 
~ 
11.4 
20.5 
60.9 
.6 
5.4 
1. 2 
100. 0 
17.7 
12. 2 
4.2 
3.4 
3.4 
3.0 
3.0 
100.0 
Note: lt>. 8% of officers gave answers in 2 or more categories . 
21. 7% of enlisted " " " u n n n 
Sanewhat CJVer halt of each group indicated in question No. 1 that 
training in these areas should be conducted both in schools and on the job. 
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In suggestions made for new ways of training, both groups were in 
agreement on ''more lectures" and "show more films." Fran there the 
two groups differed considerably'. The officer group made more 
specific recommendations as to lectures, efforts to motivate people to 
learn, and suggested showing more Navy film documentaries before 
theater movies. The third highest percentage recommendation by the 
enlisted group was to make wider distribution of material present]¥ 
being published by the Navy. 
CHAPTER V 
PRESFBT TRAlNJNG METHODS AND SP.EX:IAL PR<>GRAJ&S 
I . ANALYSIS OF PRESmT TRAINJNG PROGRAUS 
Sane form of education, or indoctrination, in the Navy• s mission 
and capabilities is boing taught to students in all Navy schools. The 
amount of time and method of presentation varies from school to school 
depending on the type of prim.ary' training being conducted. Recruits 
new to the Navy receive general orientation training on organization, 
functioning, special !!.! power presentation (mentioned earlier), and 
naval history. The highest level of study in these fields is reached 
in courses on strategy and tactics for senior officers at the Naval 
War College, Newport, R. I . 
A S'Urnlllary of curricula offered in a fev Navy training schools is 
1 
presented in Table XVI. 
~ta assembled from Catalog of u. s. Naval Training Activities 
~ Courses, NAVPF.RS 91769-B (Washlngton'i u. s . GovernmEnt Printing 
Office, 19S4), PP• 2-77. 
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TABLE XVI 
NAVY TRAIN:mG COORSES RElATED TO UISSICN AND CAPABILTIIES 
School 
U. s. Naval l ar College 
Newport, R. I . 
Students 
Admirals, generals, cap-
tains, and colonels 
Armed Forces Start College Jlilitary officers 
Norfolk, Va. with 10.15 years 
commissioned service 
Industrial College of 
t he Amed Forces 
liashington, D. c. 
National War College 
f, ashington, D. c. 
Military- officers 
with 15-24 years 
commissioned service 
Uilit~ officers 
with 15.24 years 
c~ssioned service 
Naval Postgraduate School Regular Navy officers 
General Line School who were formerl3' 
ontere;r, Calif. reserve and temporar;y 
Naval Intelligence School Officers selected 
Washington, D. c. for intelligence duty 
Naval School, Journalists LTJG through LCDR who 
Info. Officers Course show interest and 
Great Lakes, Ill. ability in PR 
NROTC Courses at 52 
colleges and univer-
sities in u.s. 
u. s. Naval Acadany 
Annapolis, d. 
Recruit Training 
Advanced enlisted 
schools 
College Students 
Yidshipmen students 
Seaman, Airmen, Firec:ten 
Selected students 
Courses Offered 
Advanced stu~ in 
strategy, tactics, 
and sea power 
Orientation in 
j oint military 
operations 
Orientation in 
world polit ics, 
econanies, and 
power matters 
Stuqy of factors 
in national power 
of U.s. and other 
nations 
Tactics and 
strategy 
Strategy 
Effect of sea 
power on history-, 
current tasks, 
functions and 
organization of 
Navr 
Fundamental con-
cepts of sea 
power, strategy, 
tactics and lo-
gistics 
(Courses similar to 
NROTC above) 
Indoctrination 
Sea power present-
ation, lectures, 
films, etc. 
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II. SP&!IAL PR~ 
~ power briefing program. A special sea power briefing 
presmtation has been prepared (1956) for Wide dissem:ination throughout 
the Navy. It is €fltitl ed 11The Increasing Importance of the u. s. Navy" 
and outlines the tactics to be employed in utilization of the Navy• s 
newest weapons in event of any future war. This presentation is an 
excellent method of bringing people up-to-date on the mission and 
capabilities of the Navy. It is nOlf a "continuing part of the 
2 
curricula of the Bureau of Naval Person.11el schools. " The same material 
is being 111ncorporated into all Navy training publications and correspond-
3 
ence course programs, " and into examination areas for advancanmt in 
rate of enlisted men. 
~Btcd career symposia. The Navy is aware of the need of its 
enlisted personnel to be recognized as indiViduals to tho extent that 
this is posoiblo in a military organiZation. In 1956 it conducted 
meetings of its senior enli sted men at the training cent rs in 
Bainbridge, Yd., and San Diego, Calif. Re-presentatives llere sent to 
these meetings fran duty stations throughout the United States and 
overseas ships and stations. 
A total of 197 recommendations were made to the Department of the 
2 
Letter report by Assistant Chief o! Naval Personnel (Education 
and Training) to the Chief of liaval Persomel, September 7, 1956, P• 1. 
3 ~., P• 2. 
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Navy in areas of special interest to enlisted career men. Those 
4 
relevant to this study were: 
l . That f!m?hasis on tbe Navy• s role be continued direot)J to 
the indi vidl.lal. 
2. That operating schedules of ships be established as far in 
advance as possible; prcmul~te the infomation, and insure that any 
changes made are done justifiab:cy and not arbitraril.y. 
3. That ship deployment schedules be published far enough in 
advance for personal planning by men. 
4. That weekly briefings be held for enlisted personnel with 
up-to-date information on current operations and deployment schedules. 
5. That briefing sessions between oa::n:tanding officers and chief 
petty officers take pl ace at least once a week. 
6 . That more emphasis be placed on relationship of local mission 
to over-all role. 
7. That Navy training films be directed toward a Navy audience, 
edited and kept up- to-date, showing latest developnents of the Navy' s 
role and mission. 
4~ ~ Report .2!! Fnlistcd Career Symposia Reca:u., endationo, a 
report -prepared by- the Office of the Chief of If aval Operations, 
OPNAVINST lOLO. l, February 12, 1957. 
CHAPTER VI 
Smoo.RY, C<lWWSICNS, AND ffiiX}Q ENDATIWS 
I. SUlDIARY 
This investigatim has produced empirical data in the area of 
knowledge and understanding that personnel have of the Navy's mission 
and capabilities. Foundation for the stu~ of this lalowledge area 
was an analysis of current ccncepts of sea power and the national 
strategy- of the United States. Out of this an&cy-sis was developed the 
concept of the Navy' a mission, roles, and functions substantiated by 
documents setting forth 1\mdamental policy directives. 
Using this background material as a frame of reference for the 
stu~, a descriptive survey of naval personnel was conducted. Social 
science r esearch tcclmiques were employed to gain as high a degree of 
validity and roliabUity as possi ble in the stu~. The survey attempted 
to measure lmawledge level and interest-attitudes of people now on aotive 
duty 1n the Navy. Uany questions in the area of "mission" and !'capabili-
ties" were asked of respondents in a l66-1nan survey sample. Conclusions 
from the analysis of responses to these questions were discussed in 
detail in Chapter IV. 
Present training raethods and programs relating to this general area 
were outlined in Chapter V. 
II. CCNCWSICNS 
There seems to be a !.!!a.~ alr.lreness in the Na'V)" of tho problem 
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investigated in this study-that of training or indoctrinating people 
on the mission and capabilities of the Navy as an instrument of national 
defense. Great strides have been taken in the past year toward soJ.ving 
this problen. J.lany teams of lecturers have been conducting the special 
.!.!! power briefings, other teams haTe been working on ways of improving 
the internal information progr1111, ca:m:tanding officers have been furnished 
a list of symposia rec endations made by senior petty officers With 
instructions to take action on a rrumber at the canmand level. ives of 
ll avymen have been shown the special sea power presentation, taken on day 
cruises aboard ships and invited to visit shore com:t1ands where their 
husbands work. 
Interviews conducted in Washington with training officials indicate 
that the academic approach to a study of subjects in these areas are as 
canplete as possible. Curricula of schools have been recently reviewed 
and revised in this regard. In man;y schools vthere time does not permit 
a full scale course of instruction, individual instruction periods are 
used for lectures and film screenings Whenever possible. 
In view of the canplete acadE2Jlio program now being followed in 
formal training schools, the recamnendations in this paper Will be in 
the nature of a very broad plan of education and internal information 
to reach deeper into the motivational and attitudinal areas of learning. 
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III. REO ENDATICNS 
Reccnmendation !2• !• 
Discussion. Internal infomation of the kind t hat relates the main 
objective or function of the individual COI!I:land to that of the over-all 
Navy seems to be the most important area for e:nphasis in a plan of edu-
cation. A man ' a education at this level in the organization can be 
int erpreted by him in more meaningful ways. In this manner a man can 
learn~ the task of his unit is in the larger organization. 'When he 
relates his unit to a larger objective it will be easier for him to make 
the next d01'1Xlward adjustment to that on a personal level. He will be 
ablo to relate individual duties more rea<:lizy to t hat of efficimt 
functioning of the canmand. Briefings, lectures, indoctrination tours 
of the canmand, and demonstrations are a few techniques available to 
help ori:tnt individuals to their awn ccm..nand. lfany of these devices 
were suggested in responses to surv~ questionnaires. Interest in the 
brlefing procedure and need for more information were incorporated as 
recocmendations by the enlisted career symposia. 
Recanmendation. That a system of command level briefings be 
established on a regular basis (weekly, monthly, or quarter~) Tfith 
attendance required of all personnel as an information and education 
-
training program. This program ehould be developed in earnest fashion 
mth sufficient high-level backihg to the point Where it becanes llbrl.J.t-
in" to the Naval Establishment as a pennanent responsibility of camnand. 
It should cover the relationship of the com.md and local mission to 
the over-all mission of the Navy. Responsibility in this IU"ea should be 
added to the check list of items to be reviewed at the annual Adminis-
trative Inspection of each camnand to insure compliance • 
• 
19 
RecCD:lendation No. _gt 
Diocussion. A comment frequently' made by men aboard ships is 
the lack of in!onnation about operating schedules (survey responses 
pointed this out) , where they arc going on the next patrol or exercise 
and !bz• Personnel indicate that not enough is told them. about the 
individual cruise schedule nor those pl.&Imed for the future. 
Recanmendation. That a campaign be :initiated to encourage 
com:nanding officers of ships to tell their personnel what the 
current unclassified operating schedules are for their vessels so 
that :o.en lllRY better plan their personal affairs and eain a sense of 
participation in executing operational or training exercises. 
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Recommendation !i£• ,2: 
Discussion. Internal information programs frequently suffer .from. 
lack of ooDrdination and planning necessary to cause news or informao-
tion material to flow from the maey- offices and control centers whore 
it is generated. Not enough enlisted journalists are available to act 
as reporters covering such wide news beats l'1i thin large COlll!nands. 
Some system of scheduling,or planning, is desirable that Will cause 
information to be brought to the attention of those in immediate 
charge and r eleased to media chBlUlela. 
Rec~endation. To investigate the feasibility of including a 
section in the public information annex to !ll operational plana 
called 11inform.ing personnel, n This section to include date that 
infomation should be r eleased to crew, a sur:nnary of how much detail 
should be released, and the name of the person responsible to see 
that it is executed on time. 1 
l See Appendix D for sample portion of public information annex 
in this regard. 
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Reca:roendation ~· .!!: 
Discussion. A general oamnent voiced by many respondents in the 
survey \fa.S that not enough copies are available of ill Hands magazine, 
Aviation ~ (both official Navy publications), and othere. The 
Enlisted group named All Hands most often as the source of nost of 
- -
their information about the Navy. 
Roeoounendation. That Wider distribution of ill Hands magazine, 
Aviation News, and o·hller similar official publications be investigated 
as a m~s of providing personnel with more educational material on 
~he mission and capabilities of the Navy. 
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Recommendation !2• z: 
Discussion. The special sea power presentation bas recent:Q-
been revised. This presentation is a very canprehensive lecture, 
illustrated with color slides, on the Navy' s mission and capabilities 
and discusses sea warfare tactics in the European area as well. The 
writer has sem the presentation tlt'ioe and studied the printed 
material concerning it. Since it has been pretested on rO\.lghl¥ 
63,000 people as indicated in the survey, it would appear that it 
may be read;y now for the next logical step in its developnent- that 
of a sound motion picture. 
Recommendation. That an :investigation be made into the 
feasibility of producing a sound motion picture on the sea power 
presentation called, "The Increasing Importance of the U. s . Navy," 
tor theater screenings as a "short subject. " 
Recanmendation !!.£• £t 
Discussion. One recognized teaching teclmique, that of 
participation, could be effective~ utilized to a higher degree in 
the teaching of mission and capabilities. By allowing a selected 
group of enlisted men to acca:apaey ships on special exercises to 
foreign countries, and to observe fleet training exercises, atanio 
weapon tests, missile firing tests, etc., woo.ld appear to be an 
excellent teaching-by-doing device. Learning by participation and 
observation in this area is the ~ meaningful of all forms of 
education. 
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A canpetitive syste:n for the most attractive cruise; such as, 
"honor cruises," would stimulate interest and lend itself to incentive 
programs designed to motivate personnel to learn more in this area. 
Those men llho are in predoorlnate~ shore-based billets would have more 
of an opportunity to see the operating forces thereby relating their 
individual duties to tho larger objectives of the Navy. 
Reoanmendation. That an investigation be made into the 
feasibility of establishing special quotas for enlisted participation 
in the more attractive overseas cruises; such as, the midshipman 
cruises to foreign countries, fleet training cruises; special weapons 
d onstrations; and on a lower level of participation, in the ~ 
cruises for dependents of naval persormel. 
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Recorrmendation !2• 1: 
Discussion. The need for improvement in dissQnination of information 
internal.:cy was com;nented upon frequentq in survey responses. The follow-
ing recommendations are made based upon those findings: 
Recanmendation That an investigation be made into the possible 
production of a beries of Navy I .Q. test-yourself ~izzes for use in 
various Navy newspapers nnd official publications. They mq be similar 
to those appearing in Reader• a Digest and other popular magazines but 
containing questions on mission, capabilities, etc . 
Recanmendation. That editors of Nnvy newspapers be encouraged 
to address a larger portion of their newspaper space and editorial 
content to Wives of naval personnel. Stimulating interest of this 
group in Navy activities gcneralJ.¥ Will serve as an effective tool to 
a better understanding or their husbands• duties and the objectives 
of the Ca:llD.alld. 
Rco~endation. That an investigation be made into the 
feasibility of establishing a Navy news bureau in ashington, D. c . 
for ship and station newspapers. Either a new secticn may be formed 
or the present functioning of the Armed Forces Press Service, as it 
pertains to Navy nsws, may be strea::U.ined for more effective and 
faster news coverage of Navy events on a national scale. 
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Air Defense. All measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness 
of the attack of hostile aircraft or guided missiles after they are 
air-borne. 
Air Superiority. That degree o:t capabi lity (preponderance in morale and 
material) of one air force over another which permits the conduct 
of air operations by' the former at a g;lven time and place without 
prohibitive interference by the opposing air force. 
Air Supremacy. Tba t degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air 
force is incapable or effective interference • 
.Amphibious Operation. An attack launched fran the sea by naval. and 
landing forces embarked 1n ships or craft involving a landing on a 
hostile shore. An amphibious operation includes final preparation 
of the objective area for the landing and operations of naval, air, 
and ground elements in over-water movanents, assault, and mutual 
support. An amphibious operation may precede a large-scale land 
operation, in which case it becanes the amphibious phase of a 
joint amphibious operation. After the troops are landed and fi.rmly 
established ashore the operation becomes a land operation. 
Antisubnarine Operations. Operations contributing to the conduct o£ 
antisubmarine warfare. 
Antisul:marine iarfare. Operations conducted against subnarines, their 
supporting forces, and operating bases. 
Base. A locality from which operations are projected or supported. 
May be preceded by a descriptive word such as "air" or "subna.r1ne1 " 
which indicates primary purpose. 
Close Air Support. The attack b,y aircraft of hostUe ground or naval 
targets which are so close to friend:cy forces as to require detailed 
integration of each air missi on with the fireand movement of those 
forces . 
Functions. Responsibilities, mi ssions, and tasks. 
In coordination with. In consultation with. This e:xpression means that 
* Fran "Functions of the inned Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, • 
Section VII, October, 1953, a directive issued by the Secretary of 
Defense and quoted in an instruction ( OPNAVms'l' 54lO. lA) issued by' the 
Chief of Naval Operations, AprU 21, 1954. 
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agencies "coordinated with" shall participate activel.1'; tbat their 
concurrence shall be sought; and that if coocurrence is not obtain-
ed, the disputed Jlllltter shall be referred to the next higher author-
ity in which all participants have a voice. 
Joint. As used :in this {functioo) paper, and general.:cy among the Anned 
Forces, connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc. in 
which elemmts of more than one service of the Department ot 
Defense participate. 
llilitary. A term used in its broadest sense meaning of or pertaining 
to war or the affairs of war, whether Arm;:,, Navy, or Air Force. 
Naval Campaign. An operation or a connected aeries of operations 
conducted essentiaJ.l1" by naval forces including all surface, sub-
surface, air, amphibious, and Uarines, for the purpose of gaining, 
extending, or maintaining control of the sea. 
Operation. A mil1tar;r action, or the carrying out of a military 
mission, strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative; 
the process of carrying on combat on land, on sea, or in the air, 
including movement, suppl.1', attack, defense, and maneuvers needed 
to gain the objectives of any battl e or campaign. 
Strategic Air Operations. Air operations contributing to the conduct 
of strategic air warfare. 
Strategic Air ar.fare. Air canbat and aupport:lng operations designed 
to effect, through the s;ystEmatic application of force to a 
selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and 
disintegration of the en~1 s war-making capacity to a point lthere 
he no longer retains the ability or the w:Ul to wage war. Vi tal 
targets may include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw 
material, critical material, stock piles, power systems, transport-
ation systems, communications facilities, concentration of uncan-
mittcd elements of enEID1' anned forces, key agricultural areas, 
and other such target systems. 
APPmDIX B 
LIST OF NAVAL CO~liDS 
FROM WHICH OFFICER SAUPLE WAS DRAWN 
Shore Ca:nmands: 
Boston Naval Shipyard, Charlestown, Jl.ass. 
Canma.nder, Boston Grou.p, Atlantic Reserve Fleet, South Boston 
Aimex, Boston Naval Shipyard, Boston, Yass. 
COlmlander, u. s. Naval Base, tJewport, R. I. 
Harbor Defense Unit, Naval Base, Portsnouth, N. H. 
Headquarters, First Naval District, Boston, Mass. 
U. s. Naval Air Station, Quonset Point, R. I . 
u. s. Naval Hospital, Newport, I . 
u. s. Naval Reserve Training Center, llanchester, N. H. 
u n ., n " , .tlew Bedford, Uass. 
fl 
n 
It 
" 
tl 
It 
tl 
n 
II 
" n 
, Providence, R. I . 
, South Portland, lie. 
" 
,, n II , 
U. s. Naval Station, Newport, R. I. 
Springfield, Uass. 
U • s. Naval War College, Newport, B. I . 
Ship Commandss 
USB ALBANY ( CA-123)- heavy cruiser 
USS OAPERT<E (DD-6.50)--destroyer 
COMMANDER CARRIER DIVISI<N FOORTEEU- ataff, diVision of 
aircraft carriers 
USS l!ACCN (CA- 132)-heavy cruiser 
USS SMALLEY ( DD-565)--destl!oyer 
OSS WASP ( OV~8)-aircraft carrier 
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APPnmn c 
COPY OF QUESTI<!mAIRE USED FOR SURVEY 
OF OFFICERS AUD INLISTED ILIDl 
I. UEM:ORANDUJl ACCOMPANYING QUESTI<lHfAIRES TO OFFICERS 
8 June 1957 
!!EMORANDUJl 
The enclosed questionnaire has been prepared as part of a research 
project in the graduate division of Boston University's Sehool of 
Public Relations and Camnunications. 
The study is being conducted as part of a thesis suggested by Rear 
Admiral E. B. Taylor. USN, Chief of In.fo:nnation, Navy Department, 
and has been approved by the Cannandant, FIRST Naval District. 
The thesis is being prepared by" t he undersigned who is one of the 
Navy-sponsored students in the graduate division this year. 
It would be appreciated 1f you would complete the questionnaire at 
your earliest convenience. Deadline for receipt :is 20 June. It is 
requested that you write the arunrere based upon y-our present know-
ledge of the topics covered. Reference to books, publications or 
other people 1n answering these questions would defeat the purpose 
of the study. 
A self-addressed a1velope is provided for returning the 
questionnaire. 
Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated. 
K. W. MOORHFAD 
Lieutenant, USN 
94 
9$ 
II. QU!STI<NNAmE 
Questionnaire on the Mission and GapabUities 
of the u. s. N&!f 
Date ~------------------
This questiormaire is part o£ a study to dete:nnine the understanding 
personnel have of the Navy's mission and its capabUities as an instrumEnt 
of national defense. It is a group study so your answers will be oanbined 
immediately with those of the other 200 people being asked the same 
questions. Your understanding of the Navy• a mission and capabUities 
and your opinions about the need for more infozmation are desired. 
The completed questionnaire will be fonmrded directly to Boston 
University' s School of Public Relations and Communications, Division of 
Research, llhere the stud¥ is being conducted. 
Your name is not needed, but it is extreme1y important that you give 
your true feelings and honest opinions in answers to these questions in 
order that the survey will be of value to the research project. The final 
report of the group study Will be made available to the Navy Department. 
, In order to tabul ate the results of the stu~ the following 
information is needed: 
What is your rato or rank? Age?~-. 
If an officer, ll'hat is your deaignator?_~~-=---=-=~-=-~=------
How maD¥ years have you served on active duty in the Navy? ___ _ 
Do you plan to make the Navy a career'?~-~----------
Are you in the reserves or the reglllar fiavy'l _______ ~_......._ 
Were you based ashore or aboard ship at your 
last penn.anent duty station?""'!:'"~o:----=:::::----------
Have you served overseas s:ince World Vfar II? _________ _ 
What command are you attached to now? 
What was the last school grade (or year_)_y_o_u-ca:np--=1:-e":"t-ed~?=-------
If you went to college, what was your major? _________ _ 
Ylhat is your marital status? 
Single Married Divorced Widower __ _ 
Do yau have dependent children? 
In which state or foreign count_ey_di-r-:-dr-y-ou.----,:11;--:-v~e~th:-e-:--::;1:-o-n-ge":"'s""':t~a-s-a-c::-;-h""':"il·d? 
ll'hat kind of work does (or did) your father do? _______ _ 
When do you expect to be out of the Navy?~~-~~~----­
Do you have a civilian skill or occupational specialty? 
-----If so, what is it? __________________ _ 
The questionnaire is divided into three parls1 Jlission, 
capabilities, and sources of infonnation. There are no right or 
~ong answers in the u&al sense. The purpose of the stu~ is to 
find out what you can tell us about these subjects. There is no 
time limit in answering the questions. 
Jlission 
l. As far as you knOW', did the NaV7 take any action in the Israeli-
Egyptian crisis? • If so, What did it do? _____ _ 
2, Do you feel that the Navy is receiving sufficient public 
reoogni tion for the job it is doing in the Jlediterranean? 
Yes. __ ..;N o. ___ Undecided __ _ 
3. Do you feel you have a good understanding of the mission of 
the three military services? 
Have very little Have sane Have a very good 
understandin~g ___ understanc:lil:lg____understandin""'g---
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4. Do you feel you have a good understanding of the Navy• s mission or not? 
Yes. __ ..;No. _ _..__Undecided ___ _ 
5. lYould you like to know more abou.t the Navy's mission or not? 
Yes. ___ No ___ Undecided...._ __ 
6. Newspapers frequently mention the following organizations. What 
do the letters stand for? 
NATO~--------------------------------------------SFATO 
---------------------------------------------~--
1. The Sixth Fleet has been kept in the Mediterranean for a number of 
years. What do you think is the purpose of keeping it there? 
a. llhich of the follolling had the most influence on your first 
enlistment in the Navy? 
To avoid being draf'ted 
Because of career opportunities in the Navy 
Because of travel opportunities the Navy offers 
Because the Navy is the most :illlportant branch of 
the service 
Relatives wanted me to join the Navy 
I like ships and the sea 
other (specify) _______________ _ 
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9. The Seventh Fleet has been kept in the Formosa area for a number 
of years. Which of the following do ;you think has been its most 
important job? 
To halt a communist attack on Formosa 
To slow dawn the spread of communiflll in southeast Asia 
To prevent the Nationalist Chinese on Fomosa !rcn ..._ __ _ 
attacking the mainland 
Because the Seventh Fleet has to be kept sanewhere 
and this is as good a place as aey 
10. What changes, if tmy1 have the nation' s leaders shown recently" 
in their attitudes about the importance of the Navy in a future 
conflict? 
Decreased Decreased No Increased Increased 
very much;._;_sane change"____ SCllle very much~--:--
11. Think of the part the Navy played in the country's defense in 
World War II. How about toda;y? How do you think the part it now 
plays compares with that of iorld liar II? 
Greater About the Less mportant 
importance same toda7 than in 
now importance orld ar II --------~ ------- --------------
12. What do you think the Navy's job is in the air defense of the 
tJnited States? 
13. In your opinion, what is the l~avy1 s mission'l {Discuss in detail 
as to roles, fUnctions, responsibilities, jobs, etc. Pl ease do not 
say just 11control of the seas.") 
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Capabilities 
1 . Since World ar II a m.mtber of scientific developments have increased 
the Navy ' e power to wage war. What are some of these~ 
2. In uhat country were the last amphibious landings made by the Navy 
under actual ca:tbat conditions? 
3. Do you happen to kn01J ...nether or not the Navy can launSll guided 
missiles frcn sulnarinee? 
Can be Can NOT be Don't 
launched..._ ___ launched...._ _ __..know __ _ 
4. Two of the Navy's experimental jet seaplanes crashed reo en~. Do 
you know if the Navy is continuing to develop this plane or not? 
Continuing Decided Don't 
to develop to drop know 
------ ------ ------
5. Do you happen to lmow haw marcy- nuclear powered sul:marines the Na"fY bas 
in service and under construction altogether1 (Include those Congress has 
appropriated funds for . ) 
3 9 15 21 6 12 18-- 24----
---
6. How maey subnarines do you think .Russia bas? 
7. Does Russia have aey rmclear powered sulnarines? Yes No 
--
8. Haw well do you feel that you. are kept informed about the capabilities 
of the Navy resulting fran new weapons? 
Little lledium well ell 
informed informed informed 
----- -----
9. Do you know what a hunter-killer group is? Yes_No __ 
10. at do you think is the prilu.ry job of a hunter- killer group'l 
n . What is the longest distance the Navy• s newest carrier-based planes 
can fly? (Total of the mileage out and back. ) 
12. What percentage of the world's land area would you guess can now be 
reached by carrier-based planes? 
Up to 25% _ 25 to 5o%_ 5o to 7$% _ 75 to 100% _ 
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13. Each new weapon is designed to fit :into the over-all capability o£ 
the Navy. Do you feel fairly certain that you know how each wou1d be 
used :in battle? 
Don't know_.__ Not sure..____. Fairly sure..___._ Very sure"_.._ 
14. The Uavy1 s new atanic weapons have caused sane change in its 
capabilities since World War II. How much change do you think has 
taken place? 
Little llodcrate Great Very great 
change __ change __ change_ change_ 
15. Do you think that the aircraft carrier is beca:rlng more important 
in the event of a future war or less important? 
Uore Leas Same Don't know 
__ __._ ----- ----- -----
16. hich weapon of .!Bl of the three military aervices do you think 
would be the most important single weapon in a fut ure war? 
-
17. List as mal\}" things you think the Navy could do to stop the enErDY 
and bring victory. Include as~ major 'Warfare activities or jobs 
as possible. 
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Sources of Information 
1. Tlhere do you get most or your information about the Navy? (List 
names or newspapers, maeazines, people, etc. ) . 
2. Do you think that ship and station newspapers are effective or 
ineffective in keeping personnel informed aboot the Navy? 
Effective Ineffective Undecided 
------ ----~ ------
3. Do you send your ship ' s nnspaper home to your famiq or fri(.nds'l 
Never ______ Sanetimes ......_ __ Often ....... ___ _ 
4. How often do you read articles on the following topics? (Check the 
column that best indicates haw often you read such articles. ) 
Navy' s role in peacetime? 
Navy' s role in ::artime'l 
Sea Power? 
New weapons" 
National strategy of u.s.? 
Articles on NATO,SEATO, and 
similar militar,y pacts? 
Never Sometimes Often 
5. Where do you think that m.oat of the instruction on the Navy• s mission 
and capabilities should be given'l 
In schools ......... _ On- the-job __ Both...__ Don r t lmow __ 
6. Sane service personnel feel that there is a great amotmt of information 
available from official Navy publications. Do you agree With this? 
Yes 
·-------
No 
---
7. Are official 1 avy publications available to you l'lhen you want to read 
than? 
Yes ....... ...._..__. No __ _ 
a. ' In your opinion, how do you think Wives of naval personnel feel about 
the amount of information they are getting about the Navy"l 
Believe they Believe they They get too much 
would like more __ have enough.___ information now __ 
9. If married, do you think it would help you in your work if your lli.fe 
lmew more about the N tX'Iy'l 
Yes __ No __ Sane __ Much--._ Don't know __ Not married.___ 
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10. The television programs called ''Victory at Sea" and "Navy Log" 
have been produced fran Navy background material. Have you seen either 
of these programs? 
Have seen one Have seEn both Have NOT seEn ei thor 
------ ------ -----
11. How effective do you t.hink these programs are in telling the public 
about. the Navy? 
Not effective ___ ll~air:q effective ___ Very effective __ _ 
12. Special lectures on t.he increaeing importance of the Navy are being 
given at many naval camn.ands. The lecture is illustrated With a series 
of color slides showing the new develor.ments and capabilities of the 
Navy. Have you seen t.his presentation? 
Yes 
-----
No __ _ 
13. Do you feel that the Navy is telling you enough about its mission? 
Yes.._ __ No 
---
14. How do you feel about the anount of information the Navy gives you 
about 11bat' s going on within the servicel 
We receive too MUCH information 
We don ' t receive FNOUGH information 
\Te receive just about the right anount of infom.ation 
15. In your opinion, is the Navy giving its people enough training on 
the mission and capabilities? 
No ___ Undecided-.... __ 
16. What are your suggestions on new ways of' keeping naval personnel 
informed about the mission and capabUities of the Navy? 
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APPr.NDII D 
SAl&PLE FORl!AT FOR PUBLIC INFOR!fATirn ANNEX TO OPERATI(!{AL Pr.ANS 
(Portion pertaining to RecCII!llllendation No. )) 
Public Information Annex 
(For a Force Commander} 
Security claseification. All information relative to this training 
exercise 'Ifill remain unclassified. 
Informing personnel. Canm.anding officers of individual ships and 
attached units are authorised and Encouraged to advise their personnel 
of dates and places involved herein itlmediately upon receipt of this 
plan. Enough additional infomation should be provided personnel so 
that they can make perscnal plans accordingly. 
~ £!. r el ease ,:!!2 press. The first news release will be made 
by the Force Canrnander approximate)¥ three weeks in advance of departure 
date of ships fran the Continental United States. 
Responsibility~ schedul1ng. It shall be the responsibility of 
the Force Plans Officer to advise the Force Public Information Officer 
of all plans as soon as they are approved. The Force Public Infomation 
Officer will prepare and release the original over-all aimounce:nent of 
this exercise. The Force Plans Officer will advise the Force Public 
Information Officer of all important changes to the original plan and 
keep him informed of current progress in execution or this exercis e . 
(other instructions in this annex would include policy 
matters in regard to news releases by subordinate 
commands, coordination between information officers, 
transportation of news media representatives anbarked 
in ships, etc. *) 
* Note: The above is recamnended as an addition to Chapter 11, 
"Exercises and Operatims, u in the .!!• ~· !i!!z Public 
Informatica Jlanual. 
